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ABSTRACT 
This paper looks at the process of transitional justice in post-conflict Sierra Leone. 
lt examines whether Sierra Leone, by granting amnesty to all combatants in the Lome 
Peace Agreement, infringed a duty under international law to prosecute grave violations of 
international humanitarian law and international human rights. Considering the 
particularities of transitional societies emerging from conflict and facing political and social 
instability, it is ascertained that amnesties should, by way of exception, be allowed in order 
to ensure peace and stability in a politically fragile post-conflict country. 
The paper continues to discuss the legitimacy that conditional amnesties, as opposed to 
blanket amnesties, have with respect to justice and accountability. It addresses truth and 
reconciliation commissions as the suitable mechanism to achieve both accountability and 
reconci I iation. 
The mandate and the work of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
as well as its relationship with the subsequently established Special Court for Sierra Leone 
are discussed. The establishment of the Special Court is regarded as contrary to the 
Government's amnesty promise under the Lome Peace Agreement. It is determined that, 
although there were substantial issues in the relationship between the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court, and although the number of perpetrators 
participating in the truth and reconciliation process was limited, the combined efforts of 
both the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court are capable of 
bringing justice and lasting peace to Sierra Leone. 
Statement on word length 
The text of this paper (excluding cover page, table of contents, abstract, 
footnotes, and bibliography) comprises approximately 15,476 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The past, it has been said, is another country. ( ... )The spotlight gyrates, exposing 
old lies and illuminating new truths. As a fuller picture emerges, a new piece of the 
jigsaw puzzle of our past settles into place. 
1 
( .. . ) 
[T]he future, too, is another country. And we can do no more than lay at its feet the 
small wisdoms we have been able to gamer out of our present experience.
2 
( ... ) 
We need to know about the past in order to establish a culture of respect for human 
rights. It is only by accounting for the past that we can become accountable for the 
future .3 
( .. . ) 
Having looked the beast of the past in the eye, having asked forgiveness and 
having made amends, let us shut the door on the past - not in order to forget it but 
in order not to allow it to imprison us.
4 
Building bridges between a past characterised by human rights 
violations having occurred under a repressive regime or during a civil war 
and a future hoped to be designed by a democratically elected government 
and realised by a local population with full respect for human dignity and 
fundamental rights is the task of what is called transitional justice.
5 The 
concept applies to certain historical situations of political transition, in 
which past authoritative regimes collapse and are replaced by democratic 
ones dedicated to promote reconciliation and peace.
6 It is also applicable to 
describe post-conflict situations in countries that have been ravaged by a 
1 Desmond Tutu, Chairperson of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume One: Chairperson's 
Foreword (CTP Book Printers [Pty] Ltd, Cape Town, 1998), para 17. 
2 Tutu, above n 1, para 19. 
3 Tutu , above n 1, para 28. 
4 Tutu, above n I , para 91. 
5 Compare Dr Kristin Henrard "The Viability of National Amnesties in View of the 
Increasing Recognition of Individual Criminal Responsibility at International Law" (1999) 
8 MSU-DCL J lnt'l L 595,629. 
6 Compare Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2003) , 9; International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) Home <www.ictj.org> (last 
accessed 03 September 2004). 
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violent civil war and struggle to find their way to peace.7 Transitional 
Justice has various forms, both judicial and non-judicial.8 Truth finding 
schemes, pursuing justice through prosecution and reparation, institution-
building and removing human rights violators from power are answers to 
previous senous human rights violations.9 The New York based 
International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) mentions, as 
achievements m the area of transitional justice in recent years, the 
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, the entry into force of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court as well as the work of over 20 truth 
commissions set up in the past 30 years, among others. 10 
This paper is going to discuss the various issues that have arisen in the 
context of transitional justice in Sierra Leone. A decade long civil war has 
left the country trying to come to terms with a legacy of most serious human 
rights violations that occurred during the conflict. To end the hostilities, the 
government offered unconditional amnesty to all armed groups. 
Simultaneously, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was 
established to address impunity among the rank and file of the combatants 
and to produce a comprehensive record of the war with the aim of national 
healing and reconciliation. 11 The TRC published its Final Report in October 
2004. After re-eruption of the conflict, a so-called "mixed" criminal 
tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was additionally 
7 See ICTJ, above n 6. The introductory words to the concept of transitional justice are as 
follows: "As a political transition unfolds after a period of violence or repression, a society 
is often confronted with a difficult legacy of human rights abuse. Countries as diverse as 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Peru, and East Timor are struggling to come to terms 
with crimes of the past. ( .. . )" This general description can be applied to both the -
presumably traditional - notion of transition that refers to countries, which have just 
emerged from an authoritative regime, and to the more recent one of countries that have 
just negotiated peace to an internal armed conflict. Furthermore, the mandate of the ICTJ 
covers countries recovering from both situations. <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 22 
November 2004). 
8 ICTJ, above n 6, <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 03 September 2004). 
9 JCTJ, above n 6, <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 3 September 2004). 
10 lCTJ, above n 6 <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 02 September 2004). 
11 In the following , the abbreviation TRC will only be used to refer to the Sierra Leone 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. For the generic term "truth and reconciliation 
commission", which is going to be used for reference to the institution as such, no capital 
letters will be used. 
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established to try those most responsible for atrocities committed during the 
war. Trials began in June 2004. 
This paper is gomg to exarrune whether the amnesty granted to the 
combatants in return for peace is reconcilable with the notion of criminal 
accountability. It is argued that a conditional rather than an unconditional 
blanket amnesty would have served the concepts of justice and 
accountability better. 
As regards the SCSL, this paper determines the advantages and 
disadvantages that such a "mixed" tribunal has over international criminal 
tribunals. 
With respect to the relationship between the TRC and the SCSL, this 
paper ascertains that the establishment of the SCSL was, as far as other 
armed groups than the RUF are concerned, contrary to the Government's 
deal amnesty for peace in the Lome Peace Agreement. As regards the RUF 
rebels, their previous breach of the peace agreement required judicial action 
to bring peace to the country. 
The paper further talks about the different mandates of the TRC and the 
SCSL as well as the discords that have arisen from their co-existence. It is 
determined that, despite there having been substantial issues arising from 
the simultaneous operation of two different bodies of transitional justice, 
their co-existence has the potential to ensure justice and accountability at all 
levels and bring lasting peace to the country. 
Essential to all mechanisms of transitional justice is a contextual 
approach tailored to the social, historic and political specificities of the 
country concerned. Each transitional country's path to peace looks 
different. 12 This paper looks at issues that have been raised and answers that 
have been found in Sierra Leone in the various segments of transitional 
12 Erin Daly "Trans formative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation" (2001/2002) 12 
Int' I Legal Persp 29 (page numbers not available). 
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justice. It intends to have a holistic view at the path of transition that this 
particular country is following. In consequence of that, explicit reference to 
other countries and processes of transition in the past is made in the form of 
general observations only. However, while being based on the particularities 
of Sierra Leone, this paper can nonetheless be the source of general 
conclusions with regard to aspects of transitional justice, namely, that of 
accountability in post-conflict societies. 
II THE CIVIL WAR IN SIERRA LEONE AND THE LOME PEACE 
AGREEMENT 
Ever smce gammg independence in 1961, Sierra Leone has been 
politically unstable and economically weak. 13 At the beginning of 1991, 
shortly before the outbreak of the civil war, the rural population was so 
severely impoverished that the newly formed rebel movement, the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), easily recruited large numbers of 
people. 14 In March 1991, RUF rebels started the civil war by attempting to 
overthrow the government. In the eight years that followed brutal and 
violent fight involving RUF rebels, the army and the government-aligned 
Civil Defence Force as well as the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) units shattered the 
country. 15 The fighting was characterised by extreme brutality of the 
combatants in the form of mass amputations following the destruction of 
entire communities, systematic rape and sexual slavery and the involvement 
of great numbers of child soldiers. 16 After numerous unsuccessful attempts 
to negotiate peace, in July 1999, the Lome Peace Agreement was signed 
between RUF and Sierra Leone's president Kabbah. It granted complete 
13 (Note) Jeana Webster "Sierre Leone - Responding to the Crisis, Planning for the Future: 
The Role of International Justice in the Quest for National and Global Security" (2001) 11 
Ind lnt' I Comp L Rev 731, 733-735. 
14 Webster, above n 13, 736. 
15 Webster, above n 13, 737; ICTJ Case Study Series "The Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission: Reviewing the First Year" (2001) <www.ictj.org> (last 
accessed 31 August 2004), I. 
16 ICTJ, above n 15, l. 
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amnesty to the combatants "in respect of anything done by them in pursuit 
of their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present 
Agreement." 17 
Amnesty can be defined as the exemption from criminal and civil 
liability. 18 However, it has to be distinguished from the notion of 
impunity. 19 Impunity has been defined as 20 
the impossibility, de iure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of human 
rights violations to account - whether in criminal, civil, administrative or 
disciplinary proceedings - since they are not subject to any inquiry that might 
lead to their being accused, arrested, tried, and if found guilty, sentenced to 
appropriate penalties, and to making reparations to their victims. 
It is understood as not only the absence of investigation and punishment, 
but as an all-embracing lack of respect for the victims of violations of norms 
and a consequent absence of 'lecture' that such violations are wrongful.21 
Amnesty is not necessarily equivalent to that wide concept. It is tantamount 
to impunity only insofar as it averts every form of accountability by denying 
?2 what has happened.-
The Lome Peace Agreement, simultaneously, provided for the 
establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission that was authorised, 
among others, to "address impunity" and "facilitate genuine healing and 
17 See ( ote) Elizabeth M. Evenson "Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone: Coordination 
Between Commission and Court" (2004) 104 Colum L Rev 730, 737. 
18 See Promotion of ational Unity and Reconciliation Act (1995) (ZA), s 20 (7)(a). 
19 Jeremy Sarkin and Erin Daly "Too Many Questions, Too Few Answers: Reconciliation 
in Transitional Societies" (2004) 35 Col um Hum Rts L Rev 661, 719. 
20 Louis Joinet, Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights/ Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Set of Principles for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, 
Definitions para A, Annex ll to Revised Final Report Prepared by Mr Joiner pursuant to 
Sub-Commission Decision 1996/119: Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human 
Rights Violations (Civil and Political) (1997) UN Doc E/CN .4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev. I, 
<www.unhchr.ch> (last accessed 17 November 2004). 
21 Sarkin and Daly, above n I 9, 719. 
22 Sarkin and Daly, above n I 9, 7 I 9. 
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reconciliation."23 
It is debatable whether the amnesty clause in the Lome Peace 
Agreement laid the foundation for impunity or whether, considering the 
establishment of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
accountability is provided for. The following section is going to elaborate 
on the role of amnesty and accountability in post-conflict Sierra Leone. 
Ill AMNESTY 
NOTIONS? 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY: RECONCILABLE 
This section 1s gomg to examine the implications of the amnesty 
provision in the Lome Peace Agreement. To establish if the amnesty clause 
caused impunity, it first has to be determined what scope the amnesty 
provision had and whether Sierra Leone had an obligation under 
international law to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights. To this 
extent, conventional as well as customary international law is going to be 
assessed. In this analysis, particular emphasis is put on the special 
circumstances transitional societies find themselves in. Subsequently, it is 
ascertained that a truth and reconciliation commission that is authorised to 
grant conditional amnesty and works alongside a criminal tribunal is the 
most adequate mechanism to address human rights violations that 
previously occurred during an internal armed conflict and to reconcile 
amnesty and accountability. 
A The Legality of Amnesties under International Law 
1 The Scope of the amnesty provision in the Lame Peace Agreement 
23 Lo111e Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone Lome, Togo 07 July 1999, article XXYl(l) <www.sierra-
leone.org> (last accessed 09 September 2004). 
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The amnesty provision in the Lome Peace Agreement, article IX (2) and 
(3) reads as follows: 
2. After the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra 
Leone shall also grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants 
and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their 
objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement. 
3. To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, 
the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action 
is taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in 
respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of 
those organisations, since March 1991, up to the time of the signing of the 
present Agreement. Jn addition, legislative and other measures necessary to 
guarantee immunity to former combatants, exiles and other persons, currently 
outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be adopted 
ensuring the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their 
reintegration within a framework of full legality. 
When the Lome Peace Agreement was signed, the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General added, on behalf of the United 
Nations, the disclaimer that the United Nations regarded the amnesty clause 
to be inapplicable with regard to violations of international humanitarian 
law.24 As a consequence, the amnesty clause only applies to crimes 
committed under Sierra Leonean law, not to violations of international law. 
The United Nations reservation does not alter the amnesty for crimes under 
domestic law as stipulated by the agreement. Since the United Nations is a 
mere moral guarantor to the agreement, not a party,25 its reservation is not 
applicable with regard to national prosecution of violations of international 
law either. The relationship between the government and the rebels, both 
being the sole parties to the agreement,26 is not affected by the United 
24 Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General Report of the Secretary-General on the 
establishment of a SCSLfor Sierra Leone S/2000/915, para 9 www.un.org (last accessed 02 
September 2004). 
25 Celina Schocken "The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and Recommendations" 
(2002) Berkeley J lnt L 436, 451; Decision 011 Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lame Accord 
Amnesty (Lame Accord Amnesty) (Judgment) (13 March 2004) SCSL-2004-15-PT-060 para 
41 (Appeals Chamber, SCSL), <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 29 November 2004). 
26 Lame Accord Amnesty, above n 25 , para 41. 
II 
Nations reservation.27 The amnesty clause is therefore invalid with respect 
to international prosecution and trial under United Nations auspices, but 
remains effective in relation to national prosecution of violations of 
international humanitarian law and to national trial of violations of domestic 
law. 
The scope of the amnesty under the Lome Peace Agreement can be 
depicted as follows: 
Violation of Violation of domestic 
international law law 
National prosecution Amnesty Amnesty 
International No amnesty/ UN Amnesty 
prosecution reservation effective 
As far as the amnesty with regard to the national trial of violations of 
international humanitarian law is concerned, it is debatable whether the 
granting of amnesty violates obligations that the government might have 
under international law. The amnesty granted to the combatants for 
violations of international law constitutes a blanket amnesty, granted 
without any condition other than the one that the acts had to be committed 
by the combatants in pursuance of their objectives. That means that 
atrocious violations of fundamental norms of international humanitarian law 
. h . h d 28 m1g t go unpums e . 
However, one could argue that the duty to prosecute has to be balanced 
with political necessity, namely inciting the combatants to negotiate peace 
in return for amnesty. 29 An assessment of the legality of the amnesty 
provision therefore entails, first, the examination of whether there is an 
obligation under international law to prosecute serious offences of 
international humanitarian law. Second, the existence of such a duty 
provided, it has to be investigated whether this duty has to be mitigated in 
27 Schocken, above n 25, 45 l. 
28 (Note) Karen Gallagher "No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities and Realities of Amnesty 
in Sierra Leone" (2000) 23 Jefferson L Rev 149, 15 I. 
29 See Diane F. Orentlicher "Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute the Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime" ( I 99 I) Yale L J 2357, 2595 . 
11 
consideration of the particularities of transitional societies. 
2 Obligations under International Law to Prosecute Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
(a) Obligations to prosecute in conventional international law 
(i) The Geneva Conventions 
Articles 49, 50 of the first Geneva Convention stipulate an explicit 
obligation to prosecute grave breaches of its provisions, namely "wilful 
killing, torture or inhuman treatment, wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation 
of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully 
and wantonly."30 The High Contracting Parties have to either try those 
persons alleged to have committed these breaches before their own courts or 
hand them over to other countries (which is described by the principle of aut 
dedere aut iudicare). However, the first Geneva Convention is only 
applicable in cases of international armed conflict and thus cannot be 
invoked in the case of amnesty being granted to rebels in an internal conflict 
like that in Sierra Leone.3' 
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions addresses internal 
conflicts and sets up a minimum standard of rules to abide by, but does not 
contain an explicit obligation to prosecute violations of its provisions.32 
Since article 3 stands by itself as a 'miniature convention ', subsequent 
provisions stipulating a duty to prosecute cannot be related to article 3.33 
Article 6(5) of the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, 
relating to non-international armed conflict, encourages governments to 
"grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the 
armed conflict." The provision was designed to "encourage gestures of 
3° Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Confederation of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (12 August 1949), article 50. 
31 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Confederation of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (12 August 1949), article 2: " ... the present Convention shall 
apply to all cases of declared war or any other armed conOict which may arise between two 
or more High Contracting Parties ... "; Henrard, above n 5, 617. 
32 Henrard, above n 5, 617. 
33 Gallagher, above n 28, 176. 
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reconciliation, which can contribute to re-establishing normal relations" in a 
post-conflict society.34 However, the granting of amnesty is seen as a matter 
of domestic discretion.35 
(ii) Specific international human rights instruments 
A specific international convention relevant m the examination of 
whether there is an obligation to prosecute under international law in the 
present case of Sierra Leone is the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.36 It does not 
require a link to an international armed conflict and is, therefore, applicable 
in the case of Sierra Leone. At the time of signing the Lome Peace 
Agreement, in 1999, Sierra Leone had only ratified the Geneva Conventions 
and its Additional Protocols.37 It had signed the Convention against Torture 
in 1985, thus prior to the Lome Peace Agreement, but did not ratify it before 
2001.38 However, while not yet establishing the consent to be legally bound 
by the provisions of the treaty,39 the signature does entail the obligation to 
refrain from any acts that might compromise the object and purpose of the 
treaty.40 Article 4 of the Convention against Torture sets up the State 
parties' obligation to make all acts of torture a criminal offence under their 
domestic criminal law and to establish appropriate penalties.41 Considering 
the abovementioned obligation arising from the signature, it is ascertained in 
34 International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 
June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Eds Yves Sandoz, Christophe 
Swinarski, Bruno Zimmermann, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Geneva 1987), para 4618. 
35 International Conunittee of the Red Cross Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 
June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Eds Yves Sandoz, Christophe 
Swinarski, Bruno Zimmermann, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Geneva 1987), para 4617. 
36 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (10 December 1984) 1465 UNTS 85 ; Karen Gallagher " o Justice, No Peace: 
The Legalities and Realities of Amnesty in Sierra Leone" (2000) 23 Jefferson L Rev 149, 
171-172; Henrard, above n 5, 618. 
37 United Nations Treaty Collection: Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-
General: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (10 December 1984) 1465 UNTS 85. 
38 United Nations Treaty Collection: Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-
General: Convention against Torture, and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (10 December 1984) 1465 UNTS 85. 
39 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (5 th Edition, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1998), 6 l 0-61 I. 
40 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) l 155 U TS 331, article 18. 
41 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (10 December 1984) 1465 U TS 85, article 4. 
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this paper that the duty under article 4 to prosecute acts of torture constitutes 
an essential duty that contributes to the realisation of the objectives and the 
purpose of the Convention . To comply with it is therefore included in the 
duty under the Vienna Convention not to defeat the aims of the treaty prior 
to ratification. An obligation to prosecute acts of torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is therefore effectively 
established for Sierra Leone under the Convention against Torture. 
The views expressed by the Committee Against Torture (CAT) in O.R. , 
M.M. and M.S. v Argentina do not impact on this finding. 42 In this 
communication, the Committee concluded that no obligations (other than a 
moral one to provide remedy) would arise for Argentina under the 
Convention against Torture with respect to a Jaw precluding prosecution for 
alleged acts of torture that had occurred before Argentina signed and ratified 
the convention and before it entered into force for Argentina, yet before it 
was even drafted. In both Argentina and Sierra Leone the acts of torture 
happened before the Convention entered into force for the respective 
country. Also, the amnesty laws were enacted before the Convention 
became effective. However, while in Argentina the acts of torture occurred 
prior to signing the Convention, the war in Sierra Leone, in which acts of 
torture occurred happened after Sierra Leone, had signed the Convention. 
The abovementioned legal effects of the signature were therefore effective 
at the time of the acts of torture. There is not just a mere "moral" obligation 
to offer a remedy to the victims as the Committee had established for 
Argentina .43 The link to the duty to prosecute these acts as established under 
the Convention is thus more express in the case of Sierra Leone. The 
communications regarding Argentina can thus not be invoked to deny a duty 
to prosecute, which exists for Sierra Leone. 
(iii) General international human rights instruments: The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
42 O.R., M.M. and M.S. v Argentina Conununications Nos. 1/1988, 2/1988, and 3/1988 
CAT/C/3/D/l, 2, and 3/1988, Annex, para 9 cited in Diane F Orentlicher « Settling 
Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute the Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime" ( 1991) 
100 Yale L J 2537 footnote 128 (not available online) . 
~
3 Cited in Orentlicher, above n 29, 2537, footnote 128 (not available online). 
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Furthermore, general international and regional human rights 
instruments have to be scrutinised as to whether they contain obligations to 
prosecute serious human rights violations.44 Article 2(3) of the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) requires State parties to 
offer effective remedies to victims of violations of Covenant rights.
45 When 
read in conjunction with article 7, the prohibition of torture, article 2(3) sets 
up the obligation to undertake investigation of alleged acts of torture, 
guarantee freedom of such acts, and offer effective remedies.46 Under the 
CCPR, providing effective remedies against acts violating Covenant rights 
embraces taking measures to prevent the reoccurrence of such acts in the 
future, in particular, through bringing to justice those who committed 
them.47 As the Human Rights Committee, later in the same Comment, refers 
to the issue of impunity, one can deduce from the Committee's words that 
'bringing to justice' means prosecution · h 48 and pums ment. More 
specifically, according to the Human Rights Committee, amnesties are 
generally incompatible with the requirements of investigation and providing 
remedies.49 
The previous examination of various sources of conventional 
international law that are relevant to Sierra Leone does not present a 
uniform picture of international law with respect to the existence of a duty 
to prosecute serious violations of international humanitarian law and human 
rights. While the Second Protocol to the Geneva Conventions allows for 
amnesties as a means to achieve peace, the Convention against Torture 
contains an explicit obligation to punish acts of torture. The Human Rights 
Committee considers amnesties to be impermissible with the CCPR. To 
44 Henrard, above n 5, 616. 
45 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 
171 , article 2(3). 
46 General Comment No. 20: Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of 
Tortllre and Cruel Treatment or Pu,zish111e11t (Article 7): 10/03192, CCPR General 
Commellt No. 20 ,(General Comment No. 20) para 14 <www.unhchr.ch> (last accessed 6 
November 2004). 
47 General Comment No. 31 Nawre of the Ge,zeral Legal Obligations Imposed 011 States 
Parties to the CCPR: 26/05/2004 CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.13 (General Comments), para 18. 
48 Contrast Emily W Schabacker "Reconciliation or Justice and Ashes: Amnesty 
Commission and the Duty to Punish Human Rights Offences" (1999) 12 NY lnt L Rev l, 
25, 36. 
49 General Comment No. 20, above n 46, para 14. 
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determine whether international law allows for amnesties, it is therefore 
necessary to look at customary international law. 
(b) Obligations to prosecute in customary international law 
Customary international law consists of two elements: a uniform and 
general State practice and the recognition by the States concerned of this 
practice as arising from a legal duty, the opinion iuris. so 
(i) Conclusion of treaties as evidence of State practice 
Treaties may give evidence of the formation of custom.
51 Their 
conclusion and the contents of their provisions, as seen in their evolution 
over time, are illustrative of what States regard to be sufficiently relevant to 
be put into legally binding words within the framework of an international 
treaty. Arguably even more than policy statements or diplomatic 
correspondence,52 the fact that States sign an international convention can 
be regarded as a clear evidence of legal motivation based on a sense of legal 
duty, thus of opinio iuris.53 A number of multilateral treaties establish a duty 
to prosecute those who have committed serious human rights violations.
54 
By way of example, the Genocide Convention requires in article IV the 
punishment of acts of genocide,55 so does the Convention against Torture 
and the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.
56 
(ii) State practice 
50 Brownlie, above n 39, 5 -7. 
51 Brownlie, above n 39, 3. 
52 See Brownlie, above n 39, 5. 
53 General Comment No. 20, above n 46, para 14 in contrast to the previous General 
Comment No. 07: Torture or Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Art 
7): 30105182, CCPR General Comment No 7, para 1, which does not address the issue of 
amnesties, but simply calls on State parties to investigate alleged acts of torture, hold 
perpetrators responsible and provide remedies for the victims. <www.unhchr.ch> (last 
accessed 19 November 2004). 
54 John Dugard "Conflicts with Truth Commissions" in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John 
R W D Jones The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002), 693, 696. 
55 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (09 December 
1948) 78 UNTS 277, article IV. 
56 International Law Commission Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind (48th session) (1996) , UN Doc N48/IO, article 3, <www.un.org> (last accessed 01 
December 2004). 
17 
lit is crucial to also investigate the actual practice of those States that are 
directly affected by the question of whether or not to grant amnesty to 
rebels, that is those that have found themselves in a post-conflict situation.
57 
Practice of these States in recent years cannot be said to be uniform in 
prosecuting and punishing those responsible for grave human rights 
violations; it is rather the absence of prosecution that seem to have emerged 
as a rule.58 There is hence a discrepancy between States' obligations as 
established in conventional international law and their actual compliance 
with these.59 It is questionable what impact this lack of congruence between 
what States sign in international treaties and what they abide by in political 
reality has on the determination of a rule of customary international law. 
Some have argued that the divergence between the legal norms and the 
factual practice behind it hinders the development of a rule of customary 
law.60 Others have stated that custom can nonetheless be established due to 
the abovementioned repeated incorporation of the duty to prosecute into 
international treaties. 6
1 International law seems to going towards the 
prohibition of amnesties, which is illustrated by the preamble of the Rome 
Statute as the most recent instrument established in international criminal 
law and that requires prosecution and punishment of the most serious crimes 
at the national level.62 As a result, it is ascertained that a duty to prosecute 
human rights atrocities is at least emerging as a rule of customary 
international law based on increasing consideration in conventional 
international law,63 while it has not yet been established as such.
64 Diane 
Orentlicher, amicus curiae to the SCSL, finds the following words to 
57 Emily W Schabacker "Reconciliation or Justice and Ashes: Amnesty Commissions and 
the Duty to Punish Human Rights Offences" ( 1999) 12 NY In L Rev l , 38. 
58 Dugard, above n 54, 698; Schabacker, above n 57, 44; Gallagher, above n 28, 181 
(listing a number of countries that have recently granted amnesty). 
59 Schabacker, above n 57, 47. 
60 Steven R Ratner "New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry into lntemalional Law" 
( 1999) 87 Geo L J 707, 726. 
61 Schabacker, above n 57, "47 referring lo Orentlicher, above n 29, 2585 (with respect to 
frave violations of physical integrity) 
2 The Rome Statute if the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) UNDCPEICC, UN 
Doc A/CONF/183/9, <www.icc-cpi.int> (last accessed 6 November 2004); Dugard, above 
n 54,698. 
63 Orentlicher, abov en 29, 2585 (with respect to grave violations of physical integrity). 
6
~ Cassese, above n 6, 315; Ratner, abov en 60, 716; Jessica Gavron "Amnesties in the 
Light of Development in International Law and the Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court" (2002) 51 lCLQ 91 , 92. 
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describe the uncertain legality of amnesties:" An amnesty that encompasses 
crimes against humanity, serious war crimes, genocide or torture would be 
of doubtful validity under international law."65 
3 Particularities of Transitional Societies 
However, despite such rule of customary international law condemning 
amnesties emerging, amnesties have to be evaluated in the light of the 
particular circumstances they were granted in. Political reality and necessity 
might prevail over norms of international law. A contextual approach to 
every individual amnesty is required to determine the demands of reality 
that impacted on the government's decision to exempt the opposing rebels 
from prosecution.66 In Sierra Leone, amnesty was given within the 
framework of a peace agreement. This raises the question whether the 
particularities of transitional societies emerging from conflict and searching 
for peace, reconciliation and stability, not have to be considered in the sense 
that the duty to prosecute, if one regards such to exist, has to be mitigated or 
modified. This question is going to be addressed in the following. 
(a)Political and social instability 
Several arguments in favour of prosecution of serious human rights 
violations that occurred during a previous conflict have been raised. Thus, it 
has been said that trials represent a clear cut with the past of a country. They 
would foster stabilisation and credibility of the new regime just as deter 
f h . h . 1 . 67 uture uman ng ts v10 at1on. 
On the other hand, it has been presumed that the newly established 
governmental institutions might be destabilised by the issues trials bring 
about. Judicial institutions might still be fragile, society be divided over 
support for the accused, both factors potentially threatening the 
consolidation of the government and the recovery of the society from 
65 Lome Accord Amnesty, above n 25, para 34. 
66 Henrard, above n 5, 639; Priscilla B Hayner " Accountability for International Crime and 
Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: International Guidelines for the Creation 
and Operation of Truth Commissions: A Preliminary Proposal" ( I 996) 59 Law & Contemp 
Prob 173, 175. 
67 Henrard, above n 5, 634. 
19 
conflict.68 Mere political convenience does certainly not exempt 
governments from prosecuting members of the previous regime or rebels 
who are responsible for most senous violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights. 69 However, this essential duty should 
not put a newly established democratic regime's survival or post-conflict 
consolidation at risk. If the country's political and social stability is severely 
70 at stake, the government should be exempt from the duty to prosecute. 
International treaties determining the duty to prosecute should hence be 
interpreted in a way that does not impose obligations on governments, 
which would prove to be disadvantageous for the country's vital interests.71 
Thus, one of the reasons to set up the TRC of South Africa, empowered to 
grant amnesty, instead of establishing a criminal tribunal, was the belief that 
the security establishment would not have contributed to the peace 
negotiations had they had reason to fear to be brought to trial.72 The creation 
and consolidation of peace would have therefore been compromised by the 
decision to prosecute the perpetrators of human rights violations. Similarly, 
many transitional Latin American countries faced the realistic threat of the 
military reclaiming power, which made abstaining from criminal 
prosecution and granting amnesty to the members of the previous regime the 
only viable way to secure stability and ultimately survival of the new 
government.73 Likewise, in Sierra Leone, amnesty was granted to the 
combatants m hope for consolidation of the peace and national 
reconciliation after a decade-long brutal war.74 
The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission considers 
amnesty granted under these prerequisites "the Least bad of available 
alternatives."75 Considering the positive impact amnesties potentially have 
68 Henrard, above n 5, 635. 
69 Henrard, above n 5, 636. 
70 Orentlicher, above n 292648; Henrard, above n 5, 644. 
71 Orentlicher, above n 29, 2600. 
72 Tutu, above n 1, para 22. 
73 Schabacker, above n 57, 15. 
14 Lome Peace Agreement between the Govemmelll of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United From of Sierra Leone Lome, Togo 07 July 1999, Article JX(3) <www.sierra-
leone.org> (last accessed 09 September 2004). 
75 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Volume 2 Chapter 2: Findings: Findings in 
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on peace negotiations, the Commission strongly criticises the establishment 
of the SCSL, which entails criminal prosecution despite the previously 
granted amnesty, indicating that this has signalled to combatants in conflicts 
to come that they cannot trust amnesty clauses.76 
(b) Need for understanding and reconciliation 
There is another crucial reason that can be mentioned to support the 
view that prosecution by the help of criminal trials is not necessarily the best 
option to address human rights violations that occurred during a civil war. 
Post-internal-conflict societies need to understand their past and learn what 
issues caused the conflict and how these can be tackled in order to prevent 
confrontation to reoccur in the future. This seems especially true in the case 
of civil wars that targeted and involved many civilians, as was the case in 
Sierra Leone,77 and that were not a mere struggle for power carried out by 
rebel groups against the government in power. Citizens wish to find out why 
certain groups of society became involved in the conflict, whether their 
neighbour played a role in the killings, why their family was targeted. In 
other words, they strongly desire to learn about the truth behind the 
atrocities in the hope to be able to come to terms with what has happened, to 
forgive and thus find their inner peace.78 At a communal and national level, 
this forgiveness will lead to mutual approach and reconciliation. 
Reconciliation is the precondition for the country's and society's rebirth as 
it embodies a collective forward-looking positively restorative attitude 
rather than a backwards-looking punitive one.79 Punishment as the last stage 
of a criminal trial seems less capable of reunite society than reconciliation 
Respect of the TRC and the SCSL for Sierra Leone, para 553, 562, <www.ictj.org> (last 
accessed 11 November 2004). 
76 Sierra Leone TRC Findings: Findings in Respect of the TRC and the SCSL for Sierra 
Leone, above n 75, para 553, 562. 
77 See Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Volume 2 Chapter 2: Findings: Findings on the 
Nature and Characteristics of the Conflict, para 75, 76, <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 11 
November 2004). 
78 See Alex Boraine 'Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way" in Robert 
Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Eds) Truth v Justice: The Morality of Trwh Commissions 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000), 141, 150. 
79 Sarkin and Daly, above n I 9, 693. 
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as it entails a less positive and 'creative' psychology. 80 
Erin Daly uses the term " transformation" to appropriately describe the 
process of society changing from one that has experienced, even condoned, 
oppression to one that values and protects human rights and the principles of 
democracy. 81 According to her, transformation is equivalent to the 
reinvention of society through dealing with past abuses and promulgating 
new values in order to deter future human rights violations. 82 She considers 
criminal trials to be inappropriate for transformative societies, saying that 
they are designed for stable societies, where, as opposed to those in 
transition, crimes are an exception rather than the rule.83 Criminal trials of 
those responsible for violations of human rights and humanitarian law do 
not have the potential to initiate a transformative healing process of society 
as a whole that is required to establish long-lasting peace and reconciliation. 
They seek to establish guilt or innocence and do not question the causes and 
history of the conflict. 84 They are characterised by formalistic procedures 
and happen in an environment detached from and inhibiting the active 
involvement of society. 85 However, to achieve national reconciliation, the 
active participation of as many individuals as possible in the truth finding 
process is desirable and required.86 People have to work closely together to 
achieve national reconciliation. 87 Only in that way can the full picture of the 
past be composed and the full lesson for the future be learnt. 
(c) Importance to ensure alternative accountability 
In light of this reasoning, refraining from formal prosecution and 
punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations during 
80 See Orentlicher, above n 29, "2550; Boraine, above n 78, 141, 147. 
81 Daly, above n 12. 
82 Daly, above n 12 
83 Daly, above n 12 
84 See Martha Mi now "The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commission Do?" in Robert 
Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Editors) Truth v Justice: The Morality of Trnth 
Commissions (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000), 238; Sarkjn and Daly, above n 
19, 716. 
85 See Mi now, above n 84, 238. 
86 Sarkin and Daly, above n 19, 693; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Volume 2 Chapter 2: 
Findings: Primary Findings, para 38, <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 11 November 2004). 
87 Daly, above n 12. 
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an internal conflict and granting amnesty to the combatants instead is an 
appropriate and desirable answer to a country's wish to come to terms with 
its past and to step into the future in unity and reconciliation . Thus, the 
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission finds the amnesty 
granted in the Lome Peace Agreement "well intentioned" "given the reality 
f h fl . " . " ,,88 H h. o t e con 1ct , as 1t was meant to secure peace. owever, to ac 1eve 
successful transformation, it is vital to find alternative and inclusive 
methods of dealing with the past and to hold those responsible accountable. 
The work of a truth and reconciliation commission can reach the aims of 
learning about the past through comprehensive truth finding and of 
achieving healing transformation of society. As an alternative means of 
finding justice, this type of commission is capable of holding human rights 
violators accountable in a manner different from traditional criminal trials 
and tailored to the specific needs of transitional societies, thus ensuring that 
serious violations of human rights do not go unpunished. The nature and 
advantages of truth commissions are going to be examined in the following 
section. 
B Ensuring Accountability: Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and 
the Advantages They Have over Criminal Tribunals 
Truth commissions have been said to be a middle way between 
prosecution, which would potentially destabilise the country, and amnesty, 
which would be contrary to obligations under international law and none of 
which are desirable for the national reconciliation process.89 A truth and 
reconciliation commission seeks and examines what is vital for the 
country's backwards-looking understanding of its past and its forward-
looking rebuilding of society and values: the truth. It encourages victims 
and perpetrators to look each other into the eye and get together in a mutual 
effort to reunite society and thus initiates reconciliation. Although differing 
88 Sierra Leone TRC Findings: Findings in Respect of the TRC and the SCSL for Sierra 
Leone, above n 75, para 553, 553 559. 
89 Henrard, above n 5, 637, 639. 
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one from another m an attempt to reach a highest possible degree of 
contextuality and adaptation to the requirements of each particular 
country,90 truth and reconciliation commissions have a number of 
advantages compared to criminal tribunals in the settling of a transitional 
society. These are going to be elaborated on in the following. 
1 Truth finding as the primary concern 
Truth and reconciliation commissions are conceptualised to disclose the 
truth. Trials, on the contrary, only disclose as much truth as is required to 
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.91 They do not aim at 
drawing a comprehensive picture of the events and their interrelationship as 
truth and reconciliation commissions do, but offer what Madeline H. Morris 
has called a "patchwork" of records. 92 Truth finding is a secondary objective 
of a criminal procedure,93 whereas it is the primary purpose of the work of a 
truth and reconciliation commission. In transitional societies, establishing 
what has happened to whom by whom and why, or to make the people who 
are generally already known to have committed particular acts acknowledge 
these acts is the pivotal concern and should be the principal endeavour.94 In 
contrast to criminal trials that focus on a particular individual, truth 
commissions that are capable of questioning systems, which is crucial in the 
examination of the antecedent of an internal conflict. 95 
2 Focus on the victim 
Truth and reconciliation commission proceedings are victim-centred. 
They place the victim's personal story and fate at the centre of attention.96 
The less formal atmosphere, free from rules of procedure and potentially 
intimidating legal language, provides a much more personal and considerate 
90 Daly, above n 12 
91 Minow, above n 84, 238. 
92 Madeline H Morris " International Guidelines Against Impunity: Facilitating 
Accountability" (1996) 59-AUT Law & Contemp Probs 29, 33. 
93 Daly, above n 12. 
94 Hayner, above n 66, 607. 
95 See Donald W Shriver, Jr "Truth Commissions and Judicial Trials: Complementary or 
Antagonistic Servants of Public Justice?" (2001) 16 J L & Religion I, 10. 
96 Mariah Jackson Christensen "The Promise of Truth Commissions in Times of 
Transition" (2002) 23 Mich J Int 1 695, 702, reviewing Priscilla B Hayner Unspeakable 
Truths: Confro111i11g State Terror and Atrocity (Routledge. ew York and London, 2001). 
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environment.97 That makes it likely to produce the desired broad historical 
record of incidents and their connections. 
As opposed to a criminal trial, where victims function as witnesses and 
have to abide by rules of evidence, in a truth and reconciliation commission 
hearing, the victim has the unique chance to give a personal narrative of 
his/her experiences to a degree that he/she considers appropriate to feel 
relieved from the burden of memory and to add his/her piece to the mosaic. 
No trial would allow for this type of narrative truth that gives the victim the 
freedom to decide what to tell in which manner and when instead of being 
interrogated conforming to rules of taking evidence.98 By giving his/her 
account of the events, the victim changes from the former, passively 
suffering person to one that actively contributes to the truth finding process. 
Instead of enduring, he/she can create. The hearings therefore have the 
wonderful potential of giving the victims back their dignity. 99 It is the view 
of this paper that the personal and encouraging atmosphere that responds to 
the needs of those who speak out and that distinguishes truth commission 
hearings from ordinary criminal trials is the crucial factor in achieving the 
principal aim of establishing the truth. 
3 Scope for Forgiveness 
Hearings also allow for personal encounter between victims and their 
perpetrators. Often victims feel the wish to meet those who have inflicted 
harm on them or their family. Some feel the desire to forgive that person 
and, too even more, to be forgiven, while often not knowing for what to be 
pardoned. Thus, in a TRC of South Africa hearing, a woman called Beth 
expresses her feelings towards the man who threw a grenade towards her at 
a Christmas party and badly injured her in the following words: 101 "It is not 
important for me, but I would really, really like this, I would like to meet 
97 Minow, above n 84,246. 
98 Minow, above n 84, 238; Sarkin and Daly, above n 19, 7 l 6. 
99 Shriver, above n 95, 14. 
100 Boraine, above n 78, 150. 
101 Beth Savage in Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume Five Chapter Nine: 
Reconciliation (CTP Book Printers [Ply] Ltd., Cape Town, 1998), 39. 
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this man that threw that grenade in an attitude of forgiveness and hope that 
he could forgive me, too, for whatever reason. But I would very much like 
to meet him." Following an actual meeting with the man after his amnesty 
hearing, she stopped having nightmares about the attack. 102 These 
encounters also help the perpetrator to accept what he/she has done, to 
apologise and benefit from the victim's desire to meet and approach each 
other in the sense that they realise they are not confronted with feelings of 
hatred and vengeance for what they have done. 
4 Disseminating the stories and adopting recommendations 
Wide publication of the stories of both victims and perpetrators as 
uncovered in commission hearings enable the wider public to share the 
stories and, with them, the truth. Getting every member of society involved 
in this process of finding and learning the truth can launch truth finding and 
reconciliation initiatives at every level of society and in various informal 
ways and thus contribute to the consolidation of peace. It also makes 
impossible any further denial of the events in the war or, as in South Africa, 
the violence during the apartheid era. 103 
The findings can be the basis for comprehensive recommendations for 
the government on how to mend the wounds of the war and prevent grave 
human rights violations from reoccurring in the future. The Sierra Leone 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission submitted comprehensive 
recommendations over a length of 100 pages in its final report, addressing 
the issues of impunity, prevention of future conflict, and reparations for the 
victims, as well as healing and reconciliation. 104 It must be said, though, 
that, due to their lack of implementing power, the commissions depend on 
the will of the governments to see their advice become reality. 105 The Sierra 
102 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Truth and Reco11ciliatio11 
Commission of South Africa Report Volume Five Chapter Nine: Reconciliation (CTP Book 
Printers [Pty] Ltd., Cape Town, 1998), 40. 
103 Daly, above n 12.; Boraine, above n 78, 152. 
104 Sierra Leone TRC Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report: 
Volume 2 Chapter: Reco111111endatio11s, <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 1 J November 2004). 
105 Priscilla B Hayner "Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of 
Fundamental Human Rights: International Guidelines for the Creation and Operation of 
Truth Comm.issions: A Preliminary Proposal" ( J 996) 59 Law & Con temp Prob 173, 175. 
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Leone TRC, therefore, emphasises its confinement to recommendations that 
it considers to be realisable with a view to government funds and capacity-
building ability. 106 
C Conditional Amnesty as a Means to Achieve Justice and 
Accountability 
1 Conditional and blanket amnesty 
As far as amnesty is concerned, truth and reconciliation comm1ss1ons 
can operate in different ways. By way of example, the TRC of South Africa 
granted amnesty only when a number of requirements were fulfilled. 
Perpetrators had to formally apply with the TRC's amnesty committee for 
amnesty in respect of any act, omission or offence associated with a political 
objective committed between March 1960" and 10 May 1994. 107 Amnesty 
was thus granted on an exclusively individual basis based on applications 
that had to relate to a particular type of offence committed during a 
particular period of time and that had to be submitted by a certain closing 
date and on the condition of full disclosure of the truth in a public 
hearing. 108 It was a conditional, thus individual amnesty. The application 
process did not automatically lead to amnesty; the Committee could refuse 
to grant amnesty where there was a disproportion between the act and the 
political objective pursued. Those whose applications were refused or who 
did not apply for amnesty could be prosecuted and brought before criminal 
tribunals. 109 
In Sierra Leone, on the contrary, the Lome Peace Agreement granted 
blank and global amnesty to all combatants without any conditions to be 
fulfilled other than that their acts had to be committed in pursuit of their 
objectives. 
106 Sierra Leone TRC Sierra Leone Trnth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report: 
Volume 2 Chapter: Recommendations: Approach of the Commission, para 13, 
<www.ictj.org> (last accessed 11 November 2004). 
107 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (1995) (ZA), s 18( I). 
108 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act ( 1995) (ZA), s 20( 1). 
109 Schabacker, above n 57, 19. 
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2 The notions of justice and accountability in transitional societies 
This section is going to examine these two fundamentally different types 
of amnesty with respect to the notion of justice. The idea of justice 
embodies the concepts of, in the negative, retribution, and, in the positive, 
compensation or balancing. It has been said that amnesty provisions cause 
an inequality of sacrifice as they exempt the perpetrator from judicial 
consequences for his wrongdoings while the victim is left with his/her grief 
and suffering. 110 In other words, amnesty can be equalled with impunity and 
impunity with injustice. 111 This is not true with regard to conditional 
amnesty, though . Justice can be said to be achieved by the fact that the 
perpetrator and applicant for amnesty has to reveal the full truth in a public 
hearing and has to admit responsibility for his acts. 112 In a way, public 
shaming is thus provoked. 11 3 Neighbours, friends and family either learn for 
the first time that someone in their middle committed atrocities or now 
know for sure what they have long been guessing. 114 From the part of the 
perpetrator, it is either admittance or acknowledgement of his/her 
wrongdoings. 115 These circumstances embrace a notion of justice that has 
nothing to do with retribution or punishment. Justice as pursued by truth and 
reconciliation commissions is a more forward-looking concept that seeks 
healing and reconciliation. In contrast to the traditional notion of retributive 
justice, it has been called restorative justice. 116 
By publicly assuming responsibility, the perpetrator 1s also held 
accountable. These two essential concepts of criminal law, justice and 
accountability, therefore have to be assessed under a different perspective 
with respect to transitional societies. As the tern1 "transitional justice" 
illustrates itself, justice in this settling is a distinctive form of justice. It has 
to take into account the particularities of transition and transfonnation of the 
country concerned. Retributive justice has no place in the concept of 
110 See Tutu, above n 1, para 35 . 
111 Daly, above n 12. 
11 2 Tutu, above n I, para 35 . 
113 Tutu, above n I, para 35. 
114 Tutu, aboven 1, para 35. 
11 5 See Minow, above n 84, "247. 
116 See for example Sarkin and Daly, above n 19, 692. 
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transition. 11 7 The notion of transitional justice goes beyond the established 
understanding of retribution. 11 8 Instead, it touches values such as 
·1· . d . 11 9 C 1 harmonisation, reconc1 iat10n an reunion. onsequent y, amnesty 
granted as response to full disclosure of the truth to someone who held him-
/herself accountable for serious crimes is a just response. 
Things are different with respect to blanket amnesty, such as the one 
granted in Sierra Leone. Amnesty is given without the perpetrators having 
to do anything in return. Their appearance in commission hearings is purely 
voluntary and they are not required, only asked and expected, to reveal the 
full truth. If they do not do so, no legal consequences will arise. Linking this 
back to the primary objective of commission hearings, establishing the truth, 
it is questionable whether the hearings in the case of blanket amnesty having 
previously been granted, reveal an identical degree and a similar quality of 
truth as hearings that are part of an application for amnesty procedure. 120 
The case of blanket amnesty can therefore illustrate, in reverse conclusion, 
the value of a conditional amnesty and the fact that the perspective of 
amnesty and amnesty actually being granted are an integral part of the quest 
for truth. Truth as sought by societies in transformation and as told by 
perpetrators with the aim to be pardoned leads to justice. 121 
3 Cooperation of a truth and reconciliation commission with a criminal 
tribunal 
Conditional amnesty, however, seems to be only truly effective when 
the possibility of being tried by a criminal tribunal in fact exists, that is 
when a truth and reconciliation commission and a criminal tribunal work 
alongside each other. Without criminal trials being a realistic factor in the 
minds of the perpetrators, the latter do not have any legal constraint to 
appear in hearings and reveal their stories. 122 The situation would thus be 
similar to a blanket amnesty. In both cases, the only incentive that 
11 7 Daly, above n 12. 
11 8 Daly, above n 12; Tutu, above n 1, para 36. 
119 Tutu, above n 1, para 36. 
120 See Daly, above n 12. 
121 Daly, above n 12. 
122 Daly, above n 12; Shriver, above n 95, 18. 
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perpetrators have to speak out before the commission and the general public 
is one that might be simply described as personal: They either carry the 
burden of guilt and hope for relief after having spoken, or they have realised 
the effects of their wrongdoings on the country as a whole and wish to 
apologise. In South Africa, criminal trials were held parallel to the TRC 
hearings for those, whose application for amnesty had not been granted. In 
Sierra Leone, the SCSL was authorised to try those bearing the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international human rights and the 
laws of Sierra Leone. 123 The jurisdiction of the SCSL is going to be 
examined in detail in Section V. 
As a result, one can ascertain that the preferable approach to transitional 
justice is a conditional amnesty, granted only in return for full disclosure of 
the truth in a public hearing and only for a specific type of crimes. A formal 
application procedure involving standardised application forms and closing 
dates makes the amnesty procedure uniform and credible. For its lack of 
incentive to contribute to the national truth finding process and its lack of 
'equality of sacrifice' and justice, blanket amnesty is to be rejected as being 
an inappropriate tool in the quest for justice and reconciliation. 
D Reparations as an Integral Part of Accountability 
It has further been argued that full effectiveness of the amnesty process 
can only be achieved if reparation for the victims is provided for. 124 
Reparation can be financial or purely symbolic. 125 Financial compensation 
is usually granted on an individual basis while symbolic reparations are 
provided collectively. 126 It can be based on both legal and moral arguments. 
123 Article!(!) Statute of the SCSL for Sierra Leone (annexed to the Agreement Between 
the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a SCSL 
for Sierra Leone) <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 05 September 2004). 
124 Minow, above n 84, 252; Madeline H Morris "International Guidelines Against 
Impunity: Facilitating Accountability" ( 1996) 59-AUT Law & Contemp Probs 29, 29. 
125 See Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Trwh and Reconciliation 
Co111111issio11 of South Africa Report Volume Five Chapter Five: Reparation and 
Rehabilitation Policy (CTP Book Printers [Ply] Ltd., Cape Town, 1998), paras 23 - 32. 
126 Joi net, above n 20, para C.40. and 41. 
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Given the concern about an equality of sacrifice, reparation seems to be an 
indispensable contribution to the quest for restorative justice and 
reconciliation, particularly in those cases where amnesty also exempts from 
civil liability. 127 The duty to provide reparation as a form of remedy for 
human rights violations can be found in international and regional human 
rights instruments. By way of example, the Human Rights Committee has 
just determined in its General Comment on the Nature of the General Legal 
Obligations Imposed on State Parties that the CCPR contains a general duty 
to provide compensation for violations of the rights set up therein that goes 
beyond the specifically established duties to compensate. 128 According to 
the Committee, reparation can involve, among others, financial restitution 
and satisfactory measures such as apologies in public or the creation of 
bi . . l 1?9 pu 1c memona s. -
In view of that, the TRC of Sierra Leone suggests in its final report as 
measures of reparations, among others, the improvement of national health 
services for war victims and lifelong free health care and prosthetic devices 
as well as monthly pensions for amputees. 130 It further recommends 
symbolic reparations, especially, the erection of memorials as places for 
acknowledgement and interactive dialogue. 131 
127 Minow, above n 84, 252 ; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume Five Chapter Five: 
Reparation and Rehabilitation Policy (CTP Book Printers [Pty] Ltd., Cape Town, 1998), 
paras 2, 3. 
28 General Comment No. 31 Nature of the General Legal Obligations Imposed on States 
Parties to the CCPR: 26/05/2004 CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/ Add.13 (General Conunents), para 16. 
129 General Comment No. 31 Nature of the General Legal Obligations Imposed on States 
Parties to the CCPR: 26/05/2004 CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.13 (General Comments), para 16. 
130 Sierra Leone TRC Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report: 
Volume 2 Chapter 3: Recommendations: Reparations, paras 482, 485-487 , 492, 
<www.ictj.org> (last accessed 11 November 2004). Having in mind its condition that 
recommendations should be realistic in terms of the government ' s financial and human 
resources, see above section 11 B, the Commission suggests the cooperation with the 
international community in order to allocate sources for the implementation of its 
recommendations, in particular, those entailing substantive expenses such as lifelong free 
health care. National sources should be the exploitation of mineral sources, taxes, and the 
recovery of assets removed from the country, paras 505-506. 
131 Sierra Leone TRC Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report: 
Volume 2 Chapter: Reco111111e11dations: Reparations, paras 499-503, <www.ictj.org> (last 
accessed 11 November 2004). 
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E Summary and Interim Conclusion 
While State practice with respect to the granting of amnesties has been 
inconsistent in the past years, 132 it is ascertained that, due to the increasing 
incorporation in international treaties, 133 a duty to abstain from amnesties 
and to prosecute serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
international human rights is at least emerging as a rule of customary 
international law. 134 Particularities of transitional societies, trying to end a 
violent conflict or recovering from one, have nonetheless to be taken into 
account in the evaluation of their duty to prosecute war criminals. 135 
In Sierra Leone, the political reality demanded amnesty to be granted as 
a promise for the parties to the conflict to lay down their weapons and end 
the decade long brutal fighting. Although the amnesty granted was 
regrettably a blanket one, the concurrent establishment of the Sierra Leone 
TRC provided, at least partly, for the possibility to achieve justice and 
accountability. The TRC proceedings were flawed by the fact that 
perpetrators had no incentive to appear before the Commission as they had 
already been granted unconditional amnesty. 136 Despite this, the TRC was 
able to set up a comprehensive record, based on thousands of statements, of 
what had happened during the war and why. The work of the TRC as well 
as facts and issues of its co-existence with the SCSL for Sierra Leone is 
going to be discussed in the following sections. 
IV THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SIERRA 
LEONE 
Each person's story is a part of the truth. Each story is like a piece of a very large 
puzzle. Nobody can tell the truth alone. At first, when you collect the stories from 
many different people, it is only a jumble of separate pieces. But when the pieces 
132 Above A 2 (c) (ii). 
133 Above A 2 (b) (ii), (iii) , (v) and (c) (i). 
134 Above A 2 (c) (ii). 
135 Above A 3. 
136 Above C 2. 
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are arranged together and put into place, then the whole picture can be seen .... 
Just imagine that every one of us carries in our pocket one small treasure .... That 
is our very own story to tell. It will be most precious, and it may be very painful to 
recall. Only when we collect the stories together will we begin to see the whole 
truth, which is as vast and as infinite as the night sky. If we study the truth very 
carefully, we will come to understand each other, and we will come to understand 
what happened in our country .... Once the stories are all collected together in one 
place - in one book - then we will share the book for everyone to read. We will be 
able to understand what happened and what went wrong. We will learn from the 
story how to make sure that the war never happens again .... When all has been 
told, we will work together to repair the wrong and build a just and fair future. 
Together we will create a vision of a peaceful Sierra Leone. 137 
A The Mandate and Composition of the TRC 
By virtue of the Lome peace agreement, the Commission was endowed 
with the power to138 
address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide for both the victims and 
the perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, [and] get a clear 
picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation. 
The Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000 converted this mandate into 
domestic Sierra Leonean law. This act substantiates the mandate by 
instructing the Commission to draw up 139 
an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and 
international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, 
from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lame Peace 
Agreement; to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to 
promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations 
and abuses suffered. 
137 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconcilation Commission Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission Report For the Children of Sierra Leone: Child-Friendly Version 2004, 1-2, 
<www.unicef.org> (last accessed 3 November 2004) 
138 Lome Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revol11tio11ary 
United Front of Sierra Leone Lame, Togo 07 July 1999, Article XXVI(l) <www.sierra-
leone.org> (last accessed 09 September 2004). 
139 Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000 Article 6( l) <www.sierra-leone.org> (last accessed 
04 September 2004). 
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In sum, the Commission was entrusted with the tasks of establishing the 
roots and the context of the conflict, promoting reconciliation and 
submitting recommendations to the government on preventing future human 
. h . l . 140 ng ts v10 at1ons. 
The TRC consisted of seven members, four from Sierra Leone besides 
three international commissioners, proposed by the United Nations Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The Sierra Leonean 
Bishop Joseph Humper chaired the TRC. 141 The commissioners from Sierra 
Leone were Laura Marcus-Jones, a former judge at the Sierra Leone High 
Court, who acted as Deputy Chair, Professor John Kamara, a college 
principal, and Professor pf public administration Sylvanus Torto. The 
international members were Satang Jow, a former Minister of Education of 
the Gambia, William Schabas, a human rights expert from Canada and 
currently head of the Irish Centre for Human Rights, and Yasmin Sooka, a 
human rights lawyer from South Africa. 142 
Ongoing violence delayed the start of the TRC' s work for a couple of 
years, and internal problems caused a decrease in credibility in its first 
months of operation. 143 It eventually started operating in late 2002. In 
October 2003, President Kabbah extended its initial one-year mandate for 
six months. 144 The TRC officially closed its office 31 March 2004. 145 The 
final report of the Commission was published 5 October 2004. 146 An 
140 See TRC Documents 20 Questions and Answers 011 the TRC No. 19 and 20 
<www.sierra-leone.org> (last accessed 09 September 2004). 
141 ICTJ , above n 15, 2 .. 
142 ICTJ , above n 15, 2. 
143 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Overview: Getting Started, para 4, 4, 6, 
<www.ictj.org>(last accessed 11 November 2004); Sierra Leone TRC Child-Friendly 
Version 2004, above n 137, JO. 
144 Article XXVl (3) Lome Peace Agreement <www.sierra-leone.org> (last accessed 06 
September 2004); ICTJ, "The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission: 
Reviewing the First Year" (2001) <www .ictj.org> (last accessed 31 August 2004),, 1. 
145 Panafrican News Agency (PANA) Daily Newswire "Sierra Leone TRC Report due 30 
August" 11 August 2004. 
146 Marian Samu Truth and Reconciliation Commission Presents Report <www.statheouse-
sl.org> (last accessed 28 October 2004); ECOSOC Press Release ECOSOC/6140 
<www.un.org >(last accessed 28 October 2004). 
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overview, the findings as well as the recommendations are publicly 
available at this stage. 147 The complete report will not be released until early 
2005.148 
B The Work of the TRC: Establishing the Truth and Initiating 
Reconciliation 
The Commission looked into the past in order to tell the story of civil war and to 
make recommendations to prevent a repetition of conflict. The Commission also 
looked to the future for the purpose of describing the kind of future post-conflict 
society that the recommendations were designed to achieve.( ... ) 
I Establishing the truth 
In order to draw a complete and true picture of Sierra Leone's recent 
past, the TRC adopted several approaches: Firstly, staff was sent around the 
country over a period of four months, from December 2002 to March 2003, 
to collect statements. 149 Following this , some people were invited to testify 
in hearings. 150 Hearings were held across the country from April to August 
2003, those addressing rape and sexual abuse being closed to the public. 151 
Some of them were thematic, dealing with topical issues like children, 
women, or management of mineral resources. 152 Public hearings were 
broadcasted entirely via radio and, as a 30minute summary, on television 
each night. 153 In total , about 13 percent of the 8,000 individual statements 
come from perpetrators. 154 One third of those who appeared in hearings 
admitted their own wrongdoings. 155 Over the entire time, research and 
investigation was undertaken all over the country to collect further 
1
~
7 ICTJ New Reports: Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report 
<www.ictj.org> (last accessed 11 November 2004). 
148 According to Email from Jake Wadland, Communication Associate at the ICTJ, from 11 
November 2004. 
149 Sierra Leone TRC Child-Friendly Version 2004, above n 137, l 0. 
150 Sierra Leone TRC Child-Friendly Version 2004, above n 137, 12. 
151 Sierra Leone TRC Child-Friendly Version 2004, above n 137, 10; lCTJ , above n 15, 4. 
152 ICTJ , above n 15, 4. 
153 ICTJ , above n 15, 4. 
154 ICTJ, above n 15, 4. 
155 lCTJ , above n 15, 4. 
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information. 156 
Particular consideration was given to the stories of the children. Up to 
10,000 children were abducted and forcefully recruited into the armed 
forces, all of which deliberately used children as soldiers. 157 When 
fighting, they were often heavily drugged to overcome their fear and their 
guilt. 158 Half of them were under the age of 13. 159 Another 10,000 children 
were abducted for sexual slavery and forced labour. 160 There was 
widespread abduction, rape and sexual slavery of girls. 161 
Having been abducted and forced to commit horrible crimes, the child 
soldiers were both perpetrators and victims. 162 All children had lost their 
identity, their memory of the past and their hopes for the future during the 
war. Some were so young; all they could remember was war and the use of 
violence. 163 
It has been said that how society responds to the child combatants may 
influence the future stability of the country. 164 Children were given special 
attention throughout the truth and reconciliation process. They were 
regarded as witnesses in all TRC hearings, so that there was no need to 
f d . . 165 H . h separate them into groups o perpetrators an victims. eanngs wit 
children were confidential such that their name and identity were kept 
hidden and no information was passed to authorities outside the TRC. 
156 Sierra Leone TRC Child-Friendly Version 2004, above n 137, 11. 
157 Sierra Leone TRC Child-Friendly Version 2004, above n 137, 15, 16. 
158 Sierra Leone TRC Child-Friendly Version 2004, above n 137, 15. 
159 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Volume 2 Chapter 2: Findings: Findings in 
Respect of Children, 465,465, <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 11 November 2004). 
160 Sierra Leone TRC Child-Friendly Version 2004, above n 137, 15, 26 .. 
161 Sierra Leone TRC Child-Friendly Version 2004, above n 137, 17. 
162 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Volume 2 Chapter 2: Findings: Findings in 
Respect of Children, 465,469, <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 11 November 2004). 
163 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Report for the Children of Sierra Leone: Child-Friendly 
Version 2004, 25, 26 <www.unicef.org> (last accessed 3 ovember 2004). 
164 Laura R Hall, Nahal Kazemi "Prospects for Justice and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone" 
(2003) 44 Harv lnt' 1 L J 287, 291. 
165 Sierra Leone TRC Child-Friendly Version 2004, above n 137, 12 .. 
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Children could give their statement or testimony in the presence of a social 
worker; only women would conduct girls' hearings . 166 Children were 
actively involved in the reporting procedure, and a child-friendly version of 
the TRC's Final Report was published. 167 
2 Initiating reconciliation and follow-up measures 
In its Final Report, the TRC suggests a variety of activities to initiate 
and enhance reconciliation. It recommends an official apology from all 
actors in the conflict, the diffusion of its report, the creation of a national 
peace day, and other symbolic activities as well as traditional and communal 
events. 168 A nationwide project called "National Vision for Sierra Leone" 
invited all citizens to communicate their vision for a peaceful future of the 
country. A large collection of drawings, poems, essays and other mediums 
of creativity were assembled as a result. The TRC suggests this to be 
transformed into a permanent exhibition and to be shown to as many people 
as possible by way of a national, even international tour or a publication. 169 
The TRC suggests the future independent national Human Rights 
Commission to act as the follow-up body to observe the implementation of 
its recommendations as was determined by the Truth and Reconciliation Act 
2000. 170 Under the Act, the government is required to submit a report 
detailing the progress of implementation three times a year, which then has 
166 Sierra Leone TRC Child-Friendly Version 2004, above n 137, 12. 
167 Sierra Leone TRC Child-Friendly Version 2004, above n 137, Methodology. 
168 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Volume 2 Chapter 3: Recommendations: 
Reco11ciliatio11 , paras 513, 518, 522, <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 11 November 2004). 
169 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Co111111issio11 Final Report: Volume 2 Chapter 3: Recommendations: 
National Vision for Sierra Leone, paras 524, 525-527, <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 11 
November 2004). 
170 Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, Article 18(1), <www.sierra-leone.org> (last 
accessed 26 November 2004); Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Volume 2 Chapter 3: 
Recommendations: Follow-Up Committee, para 548, 548, <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 11 
November 2004). 
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to be published by the Committee. 171 The TRC further recommends that the 
Committee produce an annual report evaluating the government's 
172 performance. 
The work of the TRC enjoyed general support from society and NGOs 
and the government. It is looked upon as playing a crucial role in the 
country's coming to terms with its most recent past. 173 In total, the Sierra 
Leone TRC operated over a period of almost two years, which seems 
reasonable when balancing the need for a thoroughly conducted research on 
the one hand and for a publication of the findings that ought to be close to 
the actual events on the other. With 8,000 statements collected, the TRC has 
reached a considerable number of people. With only 13% of these being 
former offenders, only a small number of perpetrators came forward, 
though. Considering that not all of them appeared in hearings and of those 
who did only a third admitted their wrongs, one can support the case made 
above that conditional amnesty, which requires the perpetrator to admit his 
wrongs in a public hearing, contributes significantly more to accountability 
than blanket amnesty where participation in the truth finding process is 
merely voluntary. 
V THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (SCSL) 
A The Situation after the Conclusion of the Lome Peace Agreement 
Despite the conclusion of the Lome Peace Agreement in 1999, fighting 
resumed in 2000. RUF rebels took hostage 500 peacekeepers of the United 
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which had been set up in 
171 Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, Article 18(2) and (3) , <www.sierra-leone.org> (last 
accessed 26 November 2004) ; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Volume 2 Chapter 3: 
Recommendations: Follow-Up Committee, paras 548, 552, 553, <www.ictj.org> (last 
accessed 11 November 2004). 
172 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Volume 2 Chapter 3: Recommendations: Follow-
Up Committee, para 548, 554, <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 11 November 2004). 
173 ICTJ, above n 15, 6. 
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1999 to help implementing the Lome Peace Agreement. 174 Consequently, 
the United Nations Security Council's authorised a significant increase in 
the number of peacekeeping military personnel. 175 UN involvement helped 
to end the fighting and move the country towards stabilisation and peace 
through disarmament, demobilisation, reconstruction of infrastructure, and 
realisation of democratic elections. 176 
By Security Council resolution 1562, in September 2004, the mandate of 
UNAMSIL was extended till 30 June 2005. 177 The mandate comprises, 
among other tasks, monitoring the security situation in the country as well 
as watching over the reintegration of former combatants, the observance of 
human rights and the re-establishment of the government's authority. 178 
Military and civilian police tasks focus on support and assistance of Sierra 
Leonean military and police forces. 179 Concurrently, the Security Council 
urges the Government to take steps to develop its police and armed forces as 
well as its criminal law system and to establish a functioning independent 
judiciary in order to be able to take over, as soon as possible, full 
responsibility from UNAMSIL for the maintenance of law and security in 
the country. 180 
B The Establishment of the SCSL and its Specificity 
174 ICTJ Activity in Sierra Leone: Background to this Country <www.1CtJ.org>, last 
accessed 22 November 2004); United Nations Peacekeeping: UNAMSIL: Background, 
<www.un.org> (last accessed 02 September 2004). 
175 ICTJ Case Study Series "The SCSL for Sierra Leone: The First Eighteen Months" 
<www.ictj.org> (last accessed 31 August 2004), I. The mission reached its maximum 
strength in military personnel with 17,500 in March 200 I, thus being the largest 
peacekeeping mission at the time and to date (United Nations Peacekeeping: UNAMSIL: 
Background, <www.un.org> [ast accessed 02 September 2004]). 
176 United Nations Peacekeeping: "What are some recent successful peacekeeping 
o~erations? Sierra Leone", <www .un.org> (last accessed 05 September 2004). 
1 7 U SC Resolution 1562 (5037) (17 September 2004), SIRES/I 562 (2004), para 1, 
<www.un.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
178 UNSC Resolution 1562 (5037) (17 September 2004), S/RES/1562 (2004), para 2, 
<www.un.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
179 UNSC Resolution 1562 (5037) (17 September 2004), S/RES/1562 (2004), para 2, 
<www. un.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
180 UNSC Resolution 1562 (5037) (17 September 2004), SIRES/ 1562 (2004), para 6 , 
<www.un.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
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After hostilities re-erupted in 2000, the Government of Sien-a Leone 
approached the United Nations, asking for assistance in trying those 
responsible for the atrocities during the civil war. 181 By Resolution 1315, the 
Security Council requested "the Secretary-General to negotiate an 
agreement with the Government of Sien-a Leone to create an independent 
Special Court for Sien-a Leone [ ... ]."182 That agreement was signed on the 
16 January 2002 and provided for the establishment of the SCSL for Sien-a 
Leone. According to the Statute of the Court, it has personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction over persons bearing "the greatest responsibility for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sien-a Leonean Jaw 
committed in the territory of Sien-a Leone since 30 November 1996 [ . . . ]."183 
As a starting date for the temporal jurisdiction, a date had to be chosen that 
included the most serious human rights violations while, at the same time, 
reasonably limited the jurisdiction so that the Court would not be 
overloaded and marked the beginning of a new phase in the war. 184 30 
November 1996 was chosen as it coincided with the signing of the Abidjan 
Peace Agreement, the first peace accord between the Government and the 
RUF, after the conclusion of which hostilities re-erupted. 185 
Being set up to try those bearing greatest responsibility for the atrocities, 
a very limited number of defendants is going to appear before the Court.. As 
of November 2004, indictments against eleven individuals have been issued, 
two of which have been withdrawn due to the death of the accused. 186 
Among the individuals are three leaders of the former Civil Defence Force 
(CDF), three of the former Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and three of 
the former Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Trials against the 
CDF accused began 3 June 2004, trials against the RUF leaders 5 July 2004. 
18 1 ICTJ, above n 175, I; Daryl A. Mundis "New Mechanisms for the Enforcement of 
International Humanitarian Law" (2001) 95 AJIL 934, 935. 
182 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) S/RES/1315 (2000) 
<www.un.org> (last accessed 02 September 2004). 
183 Statute of the SCSL for Sierra Leone (annexed to the Agreement Between the United 
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a SCSL for Sierra 
Leone), article I (I), <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 05 September 2004). 
18
~ Kofi Annan, above n 24, para 25. 
185 Kofi Annan, above n 24, para 26 (a) . 
186 Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie died in 2003. SCSL for Sierra Leone: Cases: The RUF 
Accused: Background, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accesses 23 November 2004) . 
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The trials against the AFRC leaders are scheduled to begin later this year. 187 
The Statute determines, as subject matter jurisdiction of the SCSL, the 
prosecution of crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 common to 
the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, and other violations 
of international humanitarian law as well as of certain crimes under Sierra 
Leonean law, namely offences relating to the abuse of girls and the wilful 
destruction of property as established in the respective Sierra Leonean 
acts. 188 This subject matter jurisdiction By doing so, they made the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the Court reflect the particularities of the conflict in 
Sierra Leone, where abuse of girls and the destruction of entire villages 
were widespread and relate the jurisdiction to domestic criminal law norms 
h I d · · 189 t at were a rea y m existence. 
By virtue of its being established by an agreement between the United 
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone, the Court, in its legal nature 
and in composition and jurisdiction, differs from those criminal courts that 
were established in the 1990s to address regional serious violations of 
international humanitarian law on the Balkans and in Africa, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 190 As the first tribunal 
of its kind, 191 the SCSL for Sierra Leone is a "treaty-based sui generis court 
187 SCSL for Sierra Leone: Cases: Background, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 22 
November 2004). 
188 
) Statute of the SCSL for Sierra Leone (annexed to the Agreement between the United 
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a SCSL for Sierra 
Leone), articles 2-5, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 05 September 2004). The abuse of 
girls relates to the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926 (Cap.31), the wanton 
destruction of property to the Malicious Damage Act, 1861. 
189 Nicole Fritz and Alison Smith "Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone" (2001) 25 Fordham Int'I L J 391, 408-409; see Sierra 
Leone TRC Child-Friendly Version 2004, above n 137, 17 ; Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Sierre Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final 
Report: Volume 2 Chapter 2: Findings: Findings on the Nature and Characteristics of the 
Conflict, para 75, 87, <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 11 November 2004). 
190 Kofi Annan, above n 24, para 9; Amnesty International "Establishing a SCSL for Sierra 
Leone" <www.amnesty.org> (last accessed 31 August 2004); Schocken, above n 25, 443. 
191 1CTJ, above n 175, 2; While the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET) and the United ations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) had established tribunal s in East Timor and Kosovo respectively in 2000 and 
1999 already, the SCSL is the first court that was set up with the consent of a fully 
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of mixed jurisdiction and composition", 192 that is a "mixed" tribunal. This 
hybrid character makes it different from the two International Criminal 
Tribunals in several respects. 193 Among the distinguishing positive aspects 
are the following. 
The SCSL has a much closer connection to the country where the 
violations of humanitarian law took place: it is situated in Freetown, the 
capital of Sierra Leone, and thus benefits from the identification of the local 
population that was affected by the crimes. People in Rwanda, on the other 
hand, do not necessarily feel that the tribunal (located in Tanzania) is related 
to their history. 194 Locating a criminal tribunal in the country where the 
crimes were committed, not only conveys to the people a sense of 
association of their destiny with the trials, it is also designed to impact on 
the development of the local judiciary, still in its infancy after a change of 
regime. 195 Most importantly, the Court has a mixed staff, consisting of local 
and international judges, prosecutors, head of registry and other staff 
members. 196 While the presence of international personnel ensures respect 
for international procedural standards, the involvement of local and 
expatriated legal experts helps building bridges between the international 
dimension of the work and local customs, language, and mentalities. 
Including both these perspectives seems crucial for the outcome in the 
pursuit of truth and justice after an internal conflict. 197 
functional national government. In East Timor and Kosovo, on the contrary, it was the UN 
mission that had authority to exercise all legislative, administrative and judicial powers 
(Daryl A. Mundis, above n 27, 943 and 945). 
192 Kofi Annan, above n 24, para 9. 
193 lCTJ, above n 175, 2. 
194 ICTJ, above n 175, , 8. 
195 ICTJ , above n 175, 8. 
196 From the three judges in the Trial Chamber, two are appointed by the UN Secretary-
General, one by the Government of Sierra Leone; from the five Appellate Judges, three are 
nominated by the UN Secretary-General and the remaining two by the Government of 
Sierra Leone. The presidents of both Chambers, respectively, are both appointed by the 
Secretary-General. The Prosecutor, David Crane, United States of America, was appointed 
by the UN Secretary-General, the Deputy Prosecutor, Desmond da Silva QC, Sri 
Lanka/United Kingdom, by the Government of Sierra Leone. The head of Registry, Robin 
Vincent, was appointed by the UN Secretary General. See <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 
05 September 2004). 
197 ICTJ, above n 175, 9; Hall and Kazemi, above n 164, 299. 
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The following aspects are disadvantageous for the SCSL. Unlike the 
two international tribunals that were established by Security Council 
Resolutions, 198 the Court has no formal link to the UN system. As a result, 
the Court functions on voluntary contributions and financial shortages are 
frequently faced. 199 With regard to enforcement of its mandate, the Court 
lacks the crucial UN Charter Chapter VII powers that the two International 
Criminal Tribunals possess by virtue of their having been established under 
Chapter VII. Consequently, the Court depends on States' voluntary 
cooperation in matters of arrest, extradition and detention.200 
Having presented the two institutions separately, the next chapter is 
going to examine the interrelationship between the Commission and the 
Court. 
VI COMPLEMENTARY ACCOUNTABILITY:201 ISSUES AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE COMMISSION AND THE COURT 
The SCSL was established after the TRC, while the two institutions 
operated simultaneously,202 which gave rise to a number of legal and 
practical questions of cooperation, which neither the Agreement between 
the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a SCSL nor the Statute of the Court regulated. This chapter 
is going to present these issues and answer the question of whether the 
cooperation has been satisfactory, based on the Sierra Leone TRC Final 
198 ICTY: Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) S/RES/827 (1993) <www.un.org> (last 
accessed 05/092004), ICTR: Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) S/RES/988 (1994) 
<www.un.org> (last accessed 05 September 2004). 
199 Schocken, above n 25,444; ICTJ, above n 175, 10. 
200 JCTJ,aboven 175, 10-11. 
20 1 lCTJ (Marieke Wierda, Priscilla Hayner and Paul van Zyl) "Exploring the Relationship 
Between the SCSL and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone" 
Executive Summary <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 31 August 2004). 
202 With respect to the TRC, statements were taken from December 2002 to March 2003, 
followed by hearings from April to August 2003, Sierra Leone TRC Child-Friendly 
Version 2004, above n 137, 10 .. As for the SCSL, indictments were issued throughout the 
year 2003, SCSL for Sierra Leone: Cases, <www .sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 November 
2004). 
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Report as far as the available chapters provide relevant information.203 
A The Complementary Character of Accountability 
At first glance, the co-existence of a truth commission and a criminal 
court seems to compromise the task of each of these two institutions, for 
their mandates appear mutually exclusive. While a truth commission seeks 
to find the truth about the past in order to achieve healing and reconciliation 
among perpetrators and victims, a criminal tribunal is set up to convict those 
responsible for serious crimes. One could thus express concerns about the 
possibility of ex-combatants being unwilling to testify before the truth 
commission for fear of then being prosecuted by the court.204 
However, in Sierra Leone, the SCSL was set up to try those who bear 
"greatest responsibility" for the crimes.205 The defendants are therefore 
persons formerly in a very high position in the military, numbering nine as 
of November 2004.206 
The TRC, on the other hand, was brought to life to set up a broad 
historical record of the human rights violations by listening to the voices of 
the victims and the perpetrators, the vast majority of whom are not 
prosecuted by the Court. In particular, the Prosecutor has made clear that he 
would not indict any children, that is anyone under the age of 18, of whom 
there were thousands in the anned forces during the war.207 Their part in the 
conflict can therefore be adequately examined in hearings before the TRC. 
203 The Report contains a chapter called "Transitional Justice in Sierra Leone", which 
addresses the co-existence of the TRC and the SCSL, Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconci)jation Commission Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final 
Report: Overview of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, 8, 
<www.ictj.org> (last accessed 11 November 2004). Unfortunately, this chapter has not 
been published yet. 
20
~ See Evenson, above n 17, 755. 
205 Statute of the SCSL for Sierra Leone (annexed to the Agreement Between the United 
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a SCSL for Sierra 
Leone), article 1(1), <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 05 September 2004). 
206 Above section V B. 
207 SCSL for Sierra Leone Public Affairs Office "SCSL Prosecutor Says He Will not 
Prosecute Children" (02 November 2002) Press Release <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 
08 September 2004). 
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The Commission thus has, as President Kabbah put it in its speech at the 
launch of public hearings in April 2003, a "therapeutic" effect on the 
. 1 . , . . ?08 nat1ona reconc1 1at1on process.-
Accountability for the atrocities committed is sought at different levels 
and with different intentions. This concept embraces well the approach of 
transitional justice, that is promoting understanding of society through 
comprehensive truth finding projects. Notwithstanding this clear separation 
of the mandates, in the public opinion, confusion regarding the tasks of the 
two institutions was prevailing.209 Many people who might have been 
willing to give statements or appear in a hearing decided not to participate in 
the truth finding process because they feared their information might be 
transferred to the SCSL.210 This was especially the case among former 
perpetrators.211 Plus, while resource sharing would have been practicable 
and financially desirable, the closer the two bodies are operationally 
interrelated, the more the different mandates will be blurred in the 
. . f h bi" 2 12 1mpress1on o t e pu 1c. 
B The Amnesty Provision in the Lome Peace Agreement 
As discussed in part II and III, the Lome Peace Agreement, in 
combination with the establishment of the TRC, granted full amnesty to the 
combatants in return for peace. When the SCSL for Sierra Leone was set up 
in 2002, this approach had to be re-considered, as full amnesty would have 
made the operation of the Court impossible. When the Lome Peace 
208 Address by the President His ExceL/ency Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah at the Start of 
Public Hearing of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Freetown 14 April 2003 
<www. sierra-leone.org> (last accessed 06 September 2004) 
209 Sierra Leone TRC Findings in Respect of the TRC and the SCSLfor Sierra Leone, above 
n 75, paras 553, 555, 567. 
2 10 Sierra Leone TRC Findings in Respect of the TRC and the SCSLfor Sierra Leone, above 
n 75, paras 553, 555, 568. 
2 11 Sierra Leone TRC Findings in Respect of the TRC and the SCSLfor Sierra Leone , above 
n 75, paras 553, 555, 568. 
2 12 Abdul Tejan-Cole "The Complementary and Conflicting Relationship between the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission" (2003) 6 
Yale Hum Rts & Dev L J 139, 158. 
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Agreement had been signed, though , the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General had added, on behalf of the United Nations, the 
disclaimer that the United Nations regarded the amnesty clause to be 
inapplicable with regard to violations of international humanitarian law.213 
On adopting Resolution 1315 (2000), the Security Council referred to the 
reservation made upon signing the Peace Agreement in the preamble. 
Furthermore, the Statute of the Court states in article 10 that2 14 
[a]n amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the SCSL 
in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute 
[ violations of international humanitarian law as opposed to violations of Sierra 
Leonean law in article 5] shall not be a bar to prosecution. 
As a consequence, the amnesty clause does not apply to international 
prosecution of violations of international law. The overlap of the jurisdiction 
of the SCSL with the mandate of the TRC thus presents itself as follows: 
International crimes committed prior to Lome and after 1991 are covered by 
the mandate of the TRC, those committed after 1996 are also covered by the 
jurisdiction of the SCSL. International crimes committed after Lome are 
only covered by the jurisdiction of the Court. Domestic crimes committed 
between 1991 and 1999 fall under the mandate of the TRC, but are exempt 
from prosecution and trial before the Court as the amnesty clause in the 
peace agreement prevails. Domestic crimes committed after 1999 can be 
prosecuted under article 5 of the Statute of the Court if applicable. They are 
not covered by the mandate of the Commission.215 As a table, the 
interrelated mandates of the TRC and the SCSL can be depicted as 
follows: 2 16 
213 Kofi Annan , above n 24, para 23. 
2 14 Statute of the SCSL for Sierra Leone (annexed to the Agreement Between the United 
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a SCSL for Sierra 
Leone) , article l 0, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 05 September 2004) . 
2 15 Overview in ICTJ above n 20 I , 3. 
2 16 ICTJ, above n 201, 3. 
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International International Domestic Domestic 
crimes (prior crimes ( after crimes (prior crimes (after 
to Lame) Lame) to Lame) Lame) 
TRC Mandate from No mandate Mandate from No mandate 
( article 6( 1) TRC 1991 onwards 1991 onwards 
Act 2000) 
SCSL Mandate from Mandate No mandate Mandate if 
30 November (articles 2-4 (amnesty cnme falls 
1996 (article Statute) clause under article 5 
1(1) Statute) prevails) Statute 
(article 10 
Statute) 
The power of the SCSL to exercise jurisdiction over combatants who 
allegedly committed crimes prior to the Lome Peace Agreement was 
challenged by a preliminary motion filed on behalf of the defendants Kallon 
and Bazzy Kamara. 217 They argued that the Government of Sierra Leone 
was bound by the amnesty provision in Lome. As the SCSL was a "hybrid" 
court, not a purely international one, established with the consent of the 
Government, the amnesty provision had a legal effect on the jurisdiction of 
the SCSL such that it was not authorised to assert jurisdiction over crimes 
committed before the granting of amnesty.218 
The Appeals Chamber finds that the Lome Peace Agreement does not 
have the quality of an international treaty and therefore has effects only on 
Siena Leonean domestic law. Regardless of its effects on prosecution in 
national courts, it would not affect the jurisdiction of an international court 
such as the SCSL.2 19 The Chamber emphasises that the SCSL, although 
being a "mixed" tribunal , is not part of the Siena Leonean legal system, and 
the Prosecutor acts in complete independence.220 This was further 
elaborated on in the decision on a preliminary motion on the invalidity of 
the agreement establishing the SCSL. The Appeals Chamber characterises 
217 Lome Accord Amnesty, above n 25, 
218 Lo111e Accord Amnesty, para I, 55 .. 
219 Lome Accord Amnesty, above n 25, paras 86-88. 
220 Lo111e Accord Amnesty, above n 25, para 85. 
-l7 
the SCLS as an entirely new body operating under its own statute "in the 
sphere of international law."22 1 According to the judges, the Court exercises 
its judicial power in the interest of the international community. As a result, 
article IX of the Lome Peace Agreement could not be a bar to the exercise 
of this jurisdiction.222 
While this paper agrees with the position that the SCSL operates 
regardless of the amnesty provision and therefore has the competence to 
assert jurisdiction over crimes committed prior to Lome, it nevertheless 
asserts that the Government of Sierra Leone violated the Lome Peace 
Agreement by consenting to the creation of a criminal tribunal. 
As has been established earlier, in contrast to the two international 
criminal tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the SCSL is based on an 
agreement between the United Nations and a national government. Due to 
this and its mixed composition as well as the application of both 
international and domestic laws, it is not an international, but a "mixed" 
tribunal. It is ascertained that, for a number of reasons, the international 
character, as opposed to the national one, prevails. The SCSL operates 
independently from the national penal jurisdiction; it is created by an 
international agreement that sets internationally valid standards of fair trial; 
and the number of judges appointed by the United Nations is higher than 
that of those appointed by Sierra Leone. An amnesty provision in an 
agreement concluded between a national government and a rebel group can 
therefore not impact on the jurisdiction of a tribunal with suchlike 
international character. 
However, the SCSL was created and article 10 inserted by an agreement 
221 SCSL Prosecutor against Augustine Gbao Decision on Preliminary Motion on the 
Invalidity of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra 
Leone on the Establishmelll of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (25 May 2004) SCSL-
2004-15-PT-14 l, para 6, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 29 November 2004). 
222 Decision 011 Preliminary Motion on the Invalidity of the Agreement between the United 
Nations and the Governmellf of Sierra Leone 011 the Establishment of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, above n 221, para 7. 
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to which the Government of Sierra Leone consented.223 In his letter to the 
President of the United Nations Security Council, Sierra Leone's President 
Kabbah links his request for an initiative to establish a special court on the 
RUF rebels' having breached the peace agreement.224 He considers 
mechanisms to ensure individual accountability of the RUF leaders to be the 
only way to achieve lasting peace.225 The process to establish a special court 
was therefore initiated with the specific aim to try the leaders of the RUF as 
those responsible for the breach of the peace agreement. 
However, the Statute of the SCSL makes no difference as to what armed 
group those most responsible the Court has personal jurisdiction over 
belong to. While the Government could argue that the RUF breached the 
Peace Agreement first, which exempted the Government from its 
obligations,226 no such conclusion can be drawn with regard to the members 
of other armed groups who abode by Lome. Prosecuting members of armed 
groups that had nothing to do with the RUF' s breach of the Peace 
Agreement violates the deal amnesty in return for peace. 
The Appeals Chamber finds that the requirement set up in article IX(3) 
of the Lome Peace Agreement to "ensure that no official or judicial action is 
taken against any member" of any armed group, ought to be interpreted in 
the way that it can only relate to the national official and judicial powers of 
Sierra Leone, over which the Government has authority and power.227 It 
would therefore only relate to domestic prosecution, not to international. 
However, by negotiating with the United Nations the Agreement 
establishing the SCS, the Government was in the position to suggest that 
only members of the RUF be prosecuted.228 
It is thus ascertained that the Government reneged its amnesty promise 
under the Lome Peace Agreement by consenting to the creation of the SCSL 
223 Fritz and Smith, above n 189, 425. 
224 Lome Accord Amnesty, above n 25, para 9. 
225 Lome Accord Amnesty, above n 25, para 9. 
226 Fritz and Smith, above n 189, 426. 
227 Lome Accord Amnesty, above n 25, para 63. 
228 See Fritz and Smith, above n 189, 426. 
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with jurisdiction over those bearing greatest responsibility for the atrocities 
regardless of what armed group they belong to and whether or not this 
armed group has abided by the Peace Agreement. 
Notwithstanding the above, the signing of the Agreement establishing 
the SCSL has no legal effect on the legitimacy of the SCSL or the validity 
of article 10 of its Statute.229 The only grounds, on which a provision of an 
international agreement may be regarded unlawful, are a violation of a 
peremptory norm of international law, error, fraud or coercion none of 
which has been raised in the present case.230 
The establishment of the SCSL has been viewed critically by the Sierra 
Leone TRC. While it does not assert the creation of the SCSL to be a breach 
of the Government's amnesty promise under Lome, in its Final Report, the 
Commission criticises the fact that the breach of the peace negotiated under 
Lome solely by RUF combatants lead to the prosecution of leaders of 
various armed groups apart from the RUF who had nothing to do with the 
RUF's breach of the agreement, calling such action "unwise and legally 
unsound."231 In the view of the TRC, the actions of the RUF should not 
have been made the basis for depriving others of the "benefit of 
amnesty."232 Furthermore, the TRC condemns the creation of the SCSL for 
its negative potential of signalling to future conflict parties that amnesty 
clauses in peace agreements might be unreliable and that they therefore 
cannot trust the agreement. 233 Conversely, the TRC is certainly of the 
229 Fritz and Smith, above n 189, 426. 
230 Lome Accord Amnesty, above n 25, para 63. 
23 1 In May 2000, some 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers were take hostage by RUF combatants 
(ICTJ: ICTJ Activity in Sierra Leone: Background to this Country <www.ictj.org>, last 
accessed 22 November 2004); Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Volume 2 Chapter 2: Findings: 
Findings in Respect of the TRC and the SCSL for Sierra Leone, para 553, 560, 
<www.ictj.org> (last accessed 11 November 2004). 
232 Sierra Leone TRC: Findings in Respect of the TRC and the SCSL for Sierra Leone, 
above n 75, para 560. 
233 Sierra Leone TRC Findings in Respect of the TRC and the SCSLfor Sierra Leone, above 
n 75, para 562. 
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opinion that breaches of peace accords should not be tolerated.234 
With respect to the United Nations, they had made clear on signing the 
Lome Peace Agreement that the amnesty provision did not apply to 
international prosecution. 
With regard to the Government of Sierra Leone, the TRC's critique is 
justified as has been determined above. 
Consequently, the TRC recommends the inclusion of a clause in future 
peace agreements that explicitly provides for legal consequences in case of a 
breach of the accord, thus retracting the protection of amnesty from those 
who have violated the provisions of the peace accord without abrogating the 
amnesty provision towards any other former parties to the conflict.235 This 
approach considers the political reality in war tom countries whose only 
perspective to end the suffering seems to be the granting of amnesty for 
those responsible for the atrocities. At the same time, it provides for legal 
consequences for the case of parties not abiding by the peace accord 
requirements. Thus, it sends a signal to those who are likely to breach a 
mutually negotiated peace accord that such action is intolerable. Not only do 
they breach provisions of a treaty, they also inflict even greater suffering on 
the population by destroying their renewed hopes for peace and greatly 
impact on the government's efforts to stabilise the country. In the case of 
Sierra Leone in particular, taking international peacekeepers hostage 
furthermore endangers the willingness of the international community to 
engage in peacekeeping activity in a country that has proven to be so 
dangerous. 
Implicitly regretting that no such safeguard stipulation was included in 
the Lome Peace Agreement, the TRC is generally in favour of the co-
234 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Volum e 2 Chapter 3: Recommendations: The 
Commission and the SCSL, para 481 , <www.ictj .org> (last accessed 11 November 2004). 
235 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Volume 2 Chapter 3: Recommendations: The 
Commission and the SCSL, para 481, <www.ictj.org> (last accessed I I November 2004). 
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existence of a truth and reconciliation commission and a criminal tribunal, 
stating that "Sierra Leone, with its two institutions of transitional justice in 
operation at the same time, ( ... ) had the opportunity to offer the world a 
. f k . . f fl. "?36 H h TRC umque ramewor m movmg rom con 1ct to peace. - owever, t e 
found several points of friction in the simultaneous operation of itself and 
the SCSL. They will be addressed in the following section. 
C Confidentiality and Information Sharing 
A crucial question was that of information sharing between the TRC and 
the SCSL. That question was essential because the passing of information 
gathered by the TRC in hearings and statement taking to the SCLS could 
have kept ex-combatants from testifying before the TRC for fear of 
subsequently being called before the SCSL as defendants or witnesses.237 
Conversely, the disclosure of details in public hearings before the 
Commission might have compromised criminal proceedings and caused 
suspects to elude prosecution through flight. 238 
The TRC Act in section 7(3) imposes a duty of confidentiality on the 
TRC with regard to any information received.239 However, the SCSL 
Agreement (Ratification) Act stipulates a hierarchy between the two 
institutions in favour of the SCSL, saying that "[n]otwithstanding any other 
law, every ( ... ) body created by or under Sierra Leonean law shall comply 
with any direction specified in an order of the SCSL."240 The relationship 
between the two institutions was thus, by law, characterised by the 
predominant position of the Court, which could override the confidentiality 
236 Sierra Leone TRC Findings in Respect of the TRC and the SCSLfor Sierra Leone, above 
n 75, para 563. 
237 ICTJ, above n 175, 11 ; see also Post-conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development 
and Empowerment (PRIDE) "Ex-Combatants Views of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the SCSL in Sierra Leone: A Study by PRIDE in Partnership with the 
International Center for Transitional Justice" 12 September 2002, Freetown 
<www.ictj.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004) at Chapter 4. 
238 Evenson, above n 17, 755 . 
239 Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, <www.sierra-leone.org> (last accessed 04 
September 2004). 
240 Section 21(2) SCSL Agreement (Ratification) Act 2000, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 
23 November 2004). 
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stipulation and request information from the TRC.241 This situation, 
unsatisfying in light of the aims of the Commission, called for the 
· · f 242 h negotiat10n o an agreement. However, no sue agreement was ever 
concluded.243 Major problems of coordination in this aspect have 
nonetheless been absent, since the Prosecutor David Crane explicitly stated 
that he did not intend to use TRC information in proceedings before the 
Court.244 
D Access of the TRC to SCSL Detainees 
The SCSL has some of the former leaders in custody.245 It was crucial 
for the Commission to gain access to these detainees in order to obtain their 
testimonies, as these were essential for a comprehensive understanding of 
the history of the war. 246 The Court granted this access and adopted a 
Practice Direction on the procedure to be followed. 247 It denied, on the 
contrary, the TRC's request to obtain a detainee's statement in a public 
hearing. In October 2003, the TRC submitted a request to the SCSL asking 
to let CDF leader and SCSL detainee Samuel Hinga Norman appear in a 
public hearing, characterising him as a crucial figure in the war and 
therefore of importance to the TRC proceedings.248 While the detainee 
241 ICTJ, above n 201, 5. 
242 ICTJ, above n 201, 5. 
243 Evenson, above n 17 , 732. 
244 Evenson, above n 17 at 756; see also SCSL for Sierra Leone: The Office of the 
Prosecutor, Press Release 27 February 2003 SCSL Prosecutor Addresses Seminar 
Participants; Encourages Perpetrators to Talk to the TRC <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 
08 September 2004). The issue as to whether a defence counsel could use exculpatory 
material gathered by the TRC remained unsolved, though (Evenson, above n 17, 756). 
Abdul Tejan-Cole remarks that thi s scenario would be of little concern to the TRC as a 
perpetrator would not be kept from making a testimony knowing that his information would 
be exculpatory, Abdul Tejan-Cole "The Complementary and Conflicting Relationship 
between the SCSL for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission" (2003) 
6 Yale Hum Rts & Dev L J 139, 155. 
245 Above section VI A. 
246 SeeEvenson,aboven 17, 757. 
247 SCSL for Sierra Leone "Practice Direction on the procedure following a request by a 
State, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or other legitimate authority to take a 
statement from a person in the custody of the SCSL for Sierra Leone" adopted 9 September 
2003, amended 4 October 2003 <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
248 The Request of the TRC, the submission of the Defence Counsel as well as the response 
of the Prosecution are reproduced in the SCSL for Sierra Leone Trial Chamber decision 
SCSL-2003-08 PT The Prosecutor against Samuel Hinga Norman Decision on the Request 
by the Truth and Reconciliation of Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Samuel 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF 
s3 WELLINGTON LIBRARY 
himself was willing to testify before the TRC,249 the Prosecution rejected 
the request as being contrary to the interests of justice and the integrity of 
proceedings before the SCSL.250 According to the abovementioned Practice 
Direction, these are the two sole justifications that can support a refusal of 
request for access to a detainee with the aim of conducting a public hearing 
with him.251 As said by the Prosecution, there was a risk of Hinga Norman 
telling a different version of the events in the public TRC hearing than in the 
SCSL trial under oath. Such contradictions would endanger the credibility 
of the entire criminal procedure and thus the standing of the Court. 252 It was 
furthermore asserted that Hinga Norman was different from ordinary 
citizens and that the appropriate place to examine his role in the war was a 
criminal court. 253 The Trial Chamber of the SCSL denied access of the TRC 
to Hinga Norman. It primarily based its reasoning on the fundamental 
principle of the presumption of innocence. According to Thompson J, the 
nature of the TRC proceedings was such that it related only to those who, 
Hinga Norman, 29 October 2003, Bankole Thompson J, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 
November 2004). Hinga Norman was National Co-ordinator of the Civil Defence Forces 
(CDF). According to the findings of the Sierra Leone TRC, the CDF was, although initially 
an "alternative protective mechanism" against RUF attacks, also responsible for serious 
human rights violations during the conflict, which were mostly carried out with the full 
knowledge of the leadership, that is including Hinga Norman. Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final 
Report: Volume 2 Chapter 2: Findings: Findings Military and Political History of the 
Conflict: Civil Defence Forces (CDF), para 332, <www.ictj.org> (last accessed 11 
November 2004). 
249 SCSL for Sierra Leone Trial Chamber decision SCSL-2003-08 PT The Prosecutor 
against Samuel Hinga Norman Decision on the Request by the Truth and Reconciliation of 
Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman, 29 October 2003, 
Bankole Thompson J, para 2, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
250 SCSL for Sierra Leone Trial Chamber decision SCSL-2003-08 PT The Prosecutor 
against Samuel Hinga Norman Decision on the Request by the Truth and Reconciliation of 
Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman, 29 October 2003, 
Bankole Thompson J, para 3, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
251 SCSL for Sierra Leone "Practice Direction on the procedure following a request by a 
State, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or other legitimate authority to take a 
statement from a person in the custody of the SCSL for Sierra Leone" adopted 9 September 
2003, amended 4 October 2003, para 5, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 November 
2004). 
252 SCSL for Sierra Leone Trial Chamber decision SCSL-2003-08 PT The Prosecutor 
against Samuel Hinga Norman Decision on the Request by the Truth and Reconciliation of 
Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman, 29 October 2003, 
Bankole Thompson J, para 3, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 ovember 2004). 
253 SCSL for Sierra Leone Trial Chamber decision SCSL-2003-08 PT The Prosecutor 
against Samuel Hinga Norman Decision on the Request by the Trwh and Reconciliation of 
Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman, 29 October 2003, 
Bankole Thompson J, para 3, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
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allegedly, were perpetrators and were willing to confess their guilt.254 For 
that reason, the request of the TRC was based on Hinga Norman allegedly 
being a central figure among the perpetrators.255Conducting a public hearing 
with someone who has pleaded not guilty would impact on the impartiality 
and fairness of the subsequent criminal trial.256 It would therefore be 
inappropriate for someone who, like Hinga Norman before the SCSL, has 
pleaded innocent.257 In the balancing of the opposing interests, the interest 
that all accused may have a fair and impartial trial and the valuable role of 
the TRC in establishing a comprehensive record of the past, the fundamental 
right to a fair process prevails. Similarly, the rule of law that demands a 
contentious matter be brought before a court where the accused enjoys a 
range of procedural guarantees triumphs over the right of the accused to 
exercise his free will (and decide to appear in a public hearing).258 
The decision of the Trial Chamber was brought before the Appeals 
Chamber. The Appeals Chamber, similarly to the Trial Chamber, 
emphasised the need for procedural safeguards, non-existent in hearings 
before the TRC, where the interviewee faced "impromptu questions( ... ) by 
skilled( ... ) commissioners",259 as well as the danger of a biased trial before 
254 SCSL for Sierra Leone Trial Chamber decision SCSL-2003-08 PT The Prosecutor 
against Samuel Hinga Norman Decision on the Request by the Truth and Reconciliation of 
Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Samuel Hi11ga Norman, 29 October 2003, 
Bankole Thompson J, para 12, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 ovember 2004). 
255 SCSL for Sierra Leone Trial Chamber decision SCSL-2003-08 PT The Prosecutor 
against Samuel Hinga Norman Decision on the Request by the Truth and Reconciliation of 
Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman, 29 October 2003, 
Bankole Thompson J, para 12, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
256 SCSL for Sierra Leone Trial Chamber decision SCSL-2003-08 PT The Prosecutor 
against Samuel Hinga Norman Decision on the Request by the Truth and Reconciliation of 
Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman, 29 October 2003, 
Bankole Thompson J, paral 14, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
257 SCSL for Sierra Leone Trial Chamber decision SCSL-2003-08 PT The Prosecutor 
against Samuel Hinga Norman Decision on the Request by the Truth and Reconciliation of 
Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman, 29 October 2003, 
Bankole Thompson J, para 12, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
258 SCSL for Sierra Leone Trial Chamber decision SCSL-2003-08 PT The Prosecutor 
against Samuel Hinga Norman Decision on the Request by the Truth and Reconciliation of 
Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman, 29 October 2003, 
Bankole Thompson J, para 16, <www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
259 SCSL for Sierra Leone SCSL-2004-014 (formerly SCSL-2003-08) The Prosecutor v 
Sam Hinga Norman Decision 011 Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for 
Sierra Leone and Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP against the decision of his Lordship Mr 
Justice Bankole Thompson delivered on 30 October 2003 to deny the TRC's request to hold 
a public hearing with Samuel Hi11ga Norman J P, para 21, 
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the Court subsequent to the hearing.260 It objected to the idea of a "full-scale 
public hearing broadcast ' life' before the nation."261 Instead, the Court 
referred to the alternative option of a written statement submitted to the 
Commission.262 This would allow for the mandate of the Commission to be 
fulfilled and the fundamental right to freedom of speech of the detainee to 
be respected. 263 As can be deduced from the reasoning of the SCSL, written 
statements had previously been used to receive accounts from SCSL 
detainees.264 
However, it is questionable, whether the Truth and Reconciliation Act 
2000 actually provided for the submission of written documents to the TRC, 
in other words, whether it is a legitimate tool for the TRC's work. A few 
sections that potentially allow for written accounts are examined in the 
following. 
< www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
260 SCSL for Sierra Leone SCSL-2004-014 (formerly SCSL-2003-08) The Prosecutor v 
Sam Hinga Norman Decision on Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for 
Sierra Leone and Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP against the decision of his Lordship Mr 
Justice Bankole Thompson delivered on 30 October 2003 to deny the TRC's request to hold 
a public hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman JP, para 17, 
< www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
261 SCSL for Sierra Leone SCSL-2004-014 (formerly SCSL-2003-08) The Prosecutor v 
Sam Hinga Norman Decision on Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for 
Sierra Leone and Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP against the decision of his Lordship Mr 
Justice Bankole Thompson delivered on 30 October 2003 to deny the TRC's request to hold 
a public hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman JP, para 21, 
< www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
262 SCSL for Sierra Leone SCSL-2004-014 (formerly SCSL-2003-08) The Prosecutor v 
Sam Hinga Norman Decision 011 Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for 
Sierra Leone and Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP against the decision of his Lordship Mr 
Justice Bankole Thompson delivered on 30 October 2003 to deny the TRC's request to hold 
a public hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman JP, para 21, 
< www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
263 SCSL for Sierra Leone SCSL-2004-014 (formerly SCSL-2003-08) The Prosecutor v 
Sam Hinga Norman Decision 011 Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for 
Sierra Leone and Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP against the decision of his Lordship Mr 
Justice Bankole Thompson delivered on 30 October 2003 to deny the TRC's request to hold 
a public hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman JP, para 21, 
< www.sc-sl.org> (last accessed 23 November 2004). 
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~ SCSL for Sierra Leone SCSL-2004-014 (formerly SCSL-2003-08) The Prosecutor v 
Sam Hinga Norman Decision 011 Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for 
Sierra Leone and Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP against the decision of his Lordship Mr 
Justice Bankole Thompson delivered on 30 October 2003 to deny the TRC's request to hold 
a public hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman J P, para 21: "There was not, indeed never has 
been, any inhibition against an indictee volunteering or communicating information to the 
TRC, either directly or through his lawyer. ( ... ) lt is surprising that the TRC does not 
appear ro have requested information in written form from this indictee." < www.sc-sl.org> 
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Section 8(1) of the TRC Act 2000 enumerates the competencies of the 
TRC regarding the collection of statements, evidence and other information 
to fulfil its mandate.265 While section 8(l)(a) of the TRC Act 2000 gives to 
the TRC the power to "gather, by means it deems appropriate, any 
information it considers relevant( ... ) from any source", this widely phrased 
competence seems to refer primarily, if not exclusively, to the 
Commission's background research and investigative work, established in 
section 7(l)(a), not to the conduct of hearings. The authority to interview 
individuals is explicitly set up in section 8(l)(c), thus separately from the 
information gathering in subparagraph (a). Also, section 8 establishes a 
wide range of competencies in order to facilitate the work of the 
Commission through greatest possible access to information of all kind. 266 It 
is therefore meant to make the work of the TRC as effective as possible. 
Receiving written statements rather than public and oral accounts in a 
hearing, on the contrary, is rather a limitation of the work of the 
Commission as this is build on the concept of participants delivering "open 
and transparent" stories before the Commission.267 Section 8 can therefore 
not be invoked with the aim to assert the competence of the TRC to collect 
written statements. 
Section 7(3) allows individuals to submit information to the TRC on a 
confidential basis. However, this provision is based on the concern for 
particularly vulnerable groups like children, women or girls who might not 
want to talk about very personal and difficult experience in a public 
hearing.268 Confidentiality is not an issue with respect to SCSL detainees, 
though. According to the SCSL, they do not have to be personally protected 
from giving a public account. It is rather, as was elaborated on above, the 
265 Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, Article 8( I), <www.sierra-leone.org> (last accessed 
23 November 2004). 
266 Compare the enumeration of the "functions" of the TRC in section 7(1) and the 
following determination of its "powers" in section 8(1). 
267 Sierra Leone TRC Findings in Respect of the TRC and the SCSLfor Sierra Leone, above 
n 75, para 553, 573 (a). 
268 See Sierra Leone TRC Child-Friendly Version 2004, above n 137, 12. 
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integrity and credibility of the following criminal proceeding that are at risk 
to be damaged by the appearance of the detainee in a hearing. 
However, the idea behind the Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000 is to 
equip the TRC with the widest possible range of competencies to effectively 
exercise its mandate. Despite the power to request written statement from a 
SCSL detainee as a substitute for an oral account in a public hearing not 
being explicitly determined in the Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, it is 
an efficient means to achieve the TRC' s goal to receive crucial information 
from the detainee, who is, pursuant to the mandate of the SCSL, a former 
high rank military leader in the war and can therefore give an account, 
which is vital for the truth finding process. Although the principles of 
openness and transparency as well as direct contact of the people with the 
detainee cannot be fulfilled, and interactive dialogue between the 
Commissioners and the detainee cannot be established, when the detainee 
does not appear in person, it is ascertained that truth can nonetheless be 
found. A written statement contributes to the aim of truth finding to a lesser 
degree than a testimony in a public hearing. However, it provides a certain 
amount of truth, and, in a transitional society, every single piece of the 
picture of the past is appreciated. Despite not being explicitly provided for 
in the Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, the collection of written 
statements is therefore covered by the powers of the TRC and a legitimate 
means to establish the truth. The requirement of the SCSL expressed 
towards the TRC in its appeal decision to ask detainees to submit written 
statements as a substitute for appearance in a public hearing therefore 
suggested a mechanism that would have been covered by the competencies 
of the TRC as set up in the Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000. 
The TRC, in its Final Report, sees in the decision of the SCSL to deny 
detainees the direct participation in the TRC proceedings a denial of the 
rights of all Sie1Ta Leoneans to see the truth finding process become reality 
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with respect to those most responsible for the violence during the war. 269 
The Commission also characterises the decision as a refusal of the SCSL to 
let the detainees exercise their right to free speech.270 With respect to the 
Practice Direction, the Commission finds that it lacks consideration of the 
nature and spirit of the truth finding process.27 1 The Final Report does not 
address the suggestion of submission of written statements. 
A public hearing with commissioners asking questions and the general 
public being present, presumably in very high numbers when the perpetrator 
is a former rebel leader, indeed entails the possibility of the latter 
incriminating him-/herself in the omnipresent atmosphere of truth-telling 
and seeking forgiveness. In order for him/her not to compromise his/her 
fundamental right to presumption of innocence, he/she should be allowed to 
submit a written statement to the TRC as a substitute for his/her personal 
account in a hearing. This would ensure both the rights of the detainee, 
namely freedom of expression and the presumption of innocence, and the 
functioning of the TRC, which is certainly interested in including the 
testimonies of those bearing greatest responsibility in its findings . Although 
a written statement is unable to capture the essence of a public hearing, 
specifically the communal effort to understand, forgive, and reconcile, it is a 
second-best, yet viable alternative. Without it, the TRC would not receive 
any statement at all. It is therefore regrettable that the TRC did not seize the 
opportunity offered to it by the SCSL to request information in written form 
from Hinga Norman as a prominent SCSL detainee willing to testify before 
the TRC. 
As a result of the issues arising from the TRC requesting information 
from SCSL detainees and the resulting discrepancies in the case of Samuel 
269 Sierra Leone TRC Findings in Respect of the TRC and the SCSLfor Sierra Leone, above 
n 75, para 553, 557, 573. 
270 Sierra Leone TRC Findings in Respect of the TRC and the SCSLfor Sierra Leone, above 
n 75, para 55 3, 557, 573. 
27 1 Sierra Leone TRC Findings in Respect of the TRC and the SCSLfor Sierra Leone, above 
n 75, para 553, 569. 
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Hinga Norman, the TRC deplores the failure of the two institutions to agree 
upon a definition of the nature of the co-existence and of mechanisms of 
cooperation. The saddening resume of the TRC is that"( ... ) the two bodies 
had little contact and when they intersected at the operational level, the 
relationship was a troubled one."272Surely, a determination of the 
relationship at an operational level would have been desirable and would 
have made the co-existence effective and valuable for the national process 
of transition.273 
E Contrasting Findings of the TRC and the SCSL 
It has been argued that the potential issue of the TRC and the SCSL 
reaching divergent conclusions about a particular individual might lead to a 
friction in the two-pronged process of transitional justice, impairing the path 
to reconciliation. 274 In the specific case of Sierra Leone, though, it is 
questionable whether the nature of the interrelationship between the two 
institutions substantiates this concem.275 As has been illustrated above in 
part VI A, their mandates are complementary. In the abovementioned 
decision on appeal, the Court expresses the concern that a condemnation by 
the TRC in its report might provoke expectations vis-a-vis the Court to 
pronounce a respective sentence.276 However, it raises this point with regard 
to the possible risk of deterring potential defence witnesses, not in 
consideration of a loss of credibility among the population due to divergent 
findings. 277 In such a case, given the extent of the involvement of the 
272 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Volume 2 Chapter 2: Findings: Findings in 
Respect of the TRC and the SCSL for Sierra Leone, para 553, 563, <www .ictj.org> (last 
accessed 11 November 2004). 
273 Evenson, above n 17, 739. 
274 Evenson, above n 17, 759. 
275 See Chandra Lekha Sririam "Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past 
Abuses" (2003) American University Law Review 301,421. 
276 SCSL for Sierra Leone SCSL-2004-014 (formerly SCSL-2003-08) The Prosecutor v 
Sam Hinga Norman Decision on Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for 
Sierra Leone and Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP against the decision of his Lordship Mr 
Justice Bankole Thompson delivered on 30 October 2003 to deny the TRC's request to hold 
a public hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman JP, para 17. 
277 SCSL for Sierra Leone SCSL-2004-014 (formerly SCSL-2003-08) The Prosecutor v 
Sam Hinga Norman Decision on Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for 
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accused in the atrocities, it seems highly unlikely, anyway, that the Court 
would not sentence that person. The reverse case of the TRC exculpating an 
individual, which the SCSL convicts, seems very unrealistic given the 
Court's mandate over those bearing the greatest responsibility. 
VII CONCLUSION 
Conventional international law does not offer a clear answer to the 
enquiry as to whether Sierra Leone had a duty to prosecute the serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights 
law that occurred during the civil war. Pursuant to the increasingly frequent 
and explicit incorporation of an obligation to prosecute in international 
treaties, it is ascertained that such a duty a duty is as least emerging as a rule 
of customary international law.278 By granting blanket amnesty in the Lame 
Peace Agreement, Sierra Leone therefore violated this obligation under 
international law. 
However, the amnesty was granted to put an end to a brutal internal 
armed conflict and to enhance the process of transition to peace and 
stability. This kind of extraordinary political reality in transitional societies 
requires the adoption of an equally out-of-the-ordinary framework of justice 
and accountability for serious violations of international Jaw, that of 
transitional justice. Transitional justice looks at the concepts of justice and 
accountability not through the traditional lens of retribution and punishment, 
but through that of restoration and reconciliation. Under these 
circumstances, amnesty should, by way of exception and to meet the 
demands of political reality, be allowed.279 
In the context of some post-conflict societies, a truth and reconciliation 
commission, rather than a criminal tribunal, is the appropriate institutional 
Sierra Leone and Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP against the decision of his Lordship Mr 
Justice Bankole Thompson delivered 011 30 October 2003 to deny the TRC's request to hold 
a f11blic hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman JP, para 17. 
27 Above section fTl A 2 (c) (ii). 
279 Above section Ill A 3. 
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instrument of transitional justice.280 Truth commissions are most valuable 
when they are entrusted with the task to grant amnesty that is conditional 
upon full disclosure of the truth and acceptance of responsibility. 
Accountability is more likely to be reached this way than by blanket, 
general amnesty, because nothing needs to be done to receive the benefit of 
the latter. 281 
In Sierra Leone, where the war mainly targeted civilians, a 
comprehensive truth finding process, involving all members of society, was 
indispensable to understand the context of the conflict. Although amnesty 
had already been granted to the combatants, the Sierra Leone TRC could 
make a valuable contribution to the process of transition. Interviews, 
hearings, and research helped to determine the causes and the evolution of 
the conflict. The truth finding process before the TRC gave victims a 
unique role, namely the opportunity to tell to the world the full narrative of 
their experience, rather than being bound to the role of a functional witness 
in a trial. 282 Reconciliation and re-integration ceremonies helped re-uniting 
society.283 . Although accountability and justice might not be achieved to the 
same degree as they would have with conditional amnesty, the potential of 
the truth and reconciliation process to heal the wounds of the war seems to 
be the decisive factor. 
With regard to the SCSL, the fact that it was established to prosecute military leaders of all 
groups, while solely RUF rebels committed the previous breach of the fieace agreement, 
constitutes a breach by the Government of the Lome amnesty promise. 84 As the TRC 
observes, this might make future parties to conflicts less willing to respond to the offer of 
amnesty in return for peace. To make amnesties a functioning and credible tool of 
peacemaking in transitional societies, a clause should be added to anmesty clauses that any 
breach of the p Nicole Fritz and Alison Smith "Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: 
Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone" (2001) 25 Fordham lnt' I L J 391, 425. 
eace would retract the protection of amnesty from the responsible party, 
but not from those who abide by the ceasefire.285 
280 Above section III B. 
28 1 Above section llJ C. 
282 See Minow, above n 84, 238 
283 ICTJ, above n 15, 5. 
284 Above section VI B. 
285 Above section VI B. 
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The mixed character of the SCSL makes it an adequate tool in the quest 
for justice, taking into account local customs while guaranteeing 
international standards in prosecution that are to become an integral part of 
the country ' s future judicial system. 
The TRC and the SCSL have had complementary functions . While the 
SCSL addresses impunity of those few who were ultimately responsible for 
the most serious violations of international law, the TRC helped the general 
population, victims and perpetrators, to find the truth by telling and hearing 
stories, to experience relief and forgiveness, and to obtain a comprehensive 
picture of the sources of the conflict. 
However, with two institutions of transitional justice working alongside 
each other, a clear demarcation of the mandates of the two bodies plus an 
understandable transmission of their role to the general public would have 
been required. Although the Sierra Leone TRC was able to collect a 
considerable number of statements and testimonies,286 the number of 
perpetrators coming forward was relatively small. As the TRC remarks in its 
Final Report confusion about the role and the powers of the TRC and the 
SCSL respectively were predominant in the public and potentially barred 
some perpetrators from appearing before the Commission in fear of their 
information being transferred to the SCSL.287 
Furthermore, a comprehensive regulation of the relationship of these two 
institutions prior to their operation would have been necessary to prevent 
important questions like that of access of the TRC to SCSL detainees from 
causing friction . In the view of the TRC, the lack of a clear definition of the 
coordination between the two bodies has significantly impacted on the 
efficiency of the TRC's truth finding process and on the model role the two-
pronged transitional process in Sierra Leone could have had in the world, 
286 Above section IV B. 
287 Above section V A. 
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but did not achieve.288 
Despite issues in the relationship between the TRC and the SCSL, 
overall, the combination of these two institutions of transitional justice has 
hopefully helped Sierra Leone to find its way into a peaceful future. The 
TRC has suggested a number of promising societal and governmental 
activities in all areas of concern such as the promotion of human rights and 
the rule of law, women, children, mineral resources and reparations. A 
follow-up body is going to be established to observe the implementation 
progress. The SCSL is going to sentence those most responsible for 
unspeakable atrocities. It might be a long way to peace, and considerable 
support from the international community will be necessary, but, as the 
children of Sierra Leone say in the child-friendly version of the TRC' s Final 
Report, "[t]he future is our challenge, and we cannot refuse." 289 
288 Sierra Leone TRC Findings in Respect of the TRC and the SCSLfor Sierra Leone, above 
n 75, paras 553, 557, 564-566, 563 ; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Overview: Transitional 
Justice in Sierra Leone, para 26, <www .ictj.org> (last accessed 11 November 2004). 
289 Sierra Leone TRC Child-Friendly Version 2004, above n 137, 12, <www.unicef.org> 
(last accessed 3 ovember 2004). 
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